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ANTI-BASIS*
ETHAN YALE**
Anti-basis is the untaxed benefit enjoyed by a taxpayer when a
liability or obligation is incurred. In the business context, the
untaxed benefit is an increase in asset basis or a tax deduction. In
the personal context, the untaxed benefit might take one of those
forms, or it might be (nondeductible) personal consumption. A
well-functioning income tax system must keep track of any such
untaxed benefit. If the liability from which the benefit derived is
avoided by the taxpayer, the prior untaxed benefit must be
counted as income (or must reduce basis). If there was no prior
untaxed benefit relating to a liability, exceptions are necessary to
various rules requiring income recognition (or basis reduction)
on discharge or shifting of liabilities.
Present law requires taxpayers to account for anti-basis, but it
does so ad hoc. Various sections tacitly incorporate anti-basis—
such as §§ 108(e)(2), 357(c)(3), and the partnership definition of
“liabilities” in regulation § 1.752-1(a)(4), to take just a few of the
many examples—but each section exists on an island. A few
prior commentators have sensed that a common underlying
concept ties these rules together. Prior to this Article, however,
there has been no thorough investigation of this concept.
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INTRODUCTION
Determining the impact of nearly all transactions on a taxpayer’s
taxable income requires keeping track of and examining the
relationship among a relatively small number of fundamental
concepts, including: gross income, deductions, amount realized, tax
basis, realization, recognition, capital expenditures, and depreciation.
The thesis of this Article is that there is another, largely
unappreciated, fundamental concept that feeds into the
determination of taxable income. I will refer to this concept as “antibasis.”
A loan is at once an asset to the lender and a liability to the
borrower. The lender’s tax basis in the loan is set at inception. It
equals the lender’s cost of acquiring the borrower’s promise to
repay—that is, the lender’s tax basis equals the loan proceeds
disbursed to the borrower. The borrower’s anti-basis in the loan
equals its untaxed receipt of cash. Later, when the borrower repays
principal, the lender has no income. Instead, the principal repayment
is set off against and reduces the lender’s tax basis in its asset.
Likewise, the borrower has no deduction. Instead the principal
repayment is set off against and reduces the borrower’s anti-basis in
its liability.
Thus, the amount paid by the borrower to discharge or settle a
liability minus the borrower’s anti-basis in the liability equals the
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deduction (or, if negative, income) resulting from the liability. The
arithmetic relationship among (a) the amount paid to discharge or
settle a liability, (b) the borrower’s anti-basis in the liability, and (c)
the resulting deduction or income is parallel to the relationship
among (a) the amount realized on the sale or other disposition of an
asset, (b) the owner’s basis in the asset, and (c) the resulting gain or
loss. To see the analogy it is useful to set out the relationship in
tabular form.
Table 1: The basis-anti-basis analogy
Asset disposition (§ 1001(a))1
(a)

amount realized

(b) less

basis

(c)

equals gain (loss)

Liability discharge
amount paid
less

anti-basis

equals deduction (income)

The simplest example of income relating to discharge of a
liability with anti-basis is cancellation of debt (“COD”) income.
When a borrower defaults or a lender forgives a loan, the resulting
COD income equals the difference between whatever amount is paid
(possibly zero) and the borrower’s anti-basis. In the converse case—
when the amount paid is more than anti-basis, and a deduction
results—the terminology depends on the context. To take one
example, if the liability is a bond, the excess over anti-basis paid by
the borrower to repurchase the bond is called repurchase premium
and is deductible.2
My goal is to convince you that anti-basis presently exists and is
among the fundamental concepts in income tax law. I concede that
defining and explaining the parameters of this concept is not strictly
necessary. This is obvious given that the United States has been
collecting income tax for over a century without officially
acknowledging the anti-basis concept. I argue that recognizing the
existence of anti-basis is useful nevertheless, for three reasons.
First, thinking through familiar problems using anti-basis reveals
a connection among the many rules that depend on the concept.
Comparing these rules shows that anti-basis is woven into the law in

1. I.R.C. § 1001(a)(2012). Unless otherwise noted, all references to sections are to
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-7(c) (1994).
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different ways in different domains. This invites the question whether
various departures from the usual way of accounting for anti-basis
represent good policy. I try to answer some of these questions.
Second, defining anti-basis facilitates a more concise explanation
of doctrine. In this vein, consider that we could remove the term “tax
basis” from the lexicon of income taxation and substitute in its place
some (unavoidably long) phrase like “generally, except as otherwise
provided or unless the context otherwise requires, the taxpayer’s
original cost for the property reduced by amounts properly
chargeable to capital and increased by capital expenditures made with
respect to the subject property.” The exceptions (mostly for
nonrecognition transactions) would then have to be tacked on. The
increase in turgidity that would result from this change would be
profound. Clarifying the role of anti-basis in evaluating the tax
consequences of transactions involving liabilities will help to clarify
speaking—and, therefore, hopefully clarify thinking—about the tax
treatment of liabilities, particularly when they are shifted from one
taxpayer to another.
Third, acknowledging the existence of anti-basis as a meaningful
concept takes pressure off of the related question of how to define the
term “liability” for tax purposes. (This third reason is an extension of
and perhaps a subset of the second reason, mentioned in the prior
paragraph, but it is sufficiently important that it deserves to be
mentioned separately.) It is difficult to overstate the practical
significance of how “liability” is defined. This has been the central
focus of hundreds if not thousands of court cases and numerous
important statutory and regulatory reforms.3 As detailed below,
disputes about the precise meaning of “liability” are in most instances
disputes about whether some “obligation” has anti-basis.
(“Obligation” is a term tax lawyers use to define an umbrella category
that encompasses “liabilities,” in the technical sense used in various
code sections and regulations, as well as other debts or commitments
that fall outside the agreed on or claimed definition of “liabilities.”) If
the focus were placed on the question of whether a given obligation

3. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763, 2854–55 (1978)
(codified at I.R.C. § 365(a), (c) and amending § 357(c)); United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct.
557, 563–65 (2013); T.D. 9207, 2005-26 I.R.B. 1344–68, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs
/irb05-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVN2-6KGH] (amending Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4), the
definition of “liability” for purposes of partnership taxation under Subchapter K); Warren
Rojas, Son-of-BOSS Settlement Nets $3.2 Billion for IRS, 106 TAX NOTES 1493, 1493
(2005) (reporting the IRS settlement initiative of cases centering on definition of liability
nets $3.2 billion).
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has or lacks anti-basis, rather than on whether a particular obligation
is a liability, conceptual mistakes would be avoided.4
I. BACKGROUND
I do not claim originality for the anti-basis idea. Though I know
of no sustained discussion of anti-basis (or of the same concept by a
different name) in tax policy literature, there have been a few
references to the concept in prior scholarship. The earliest reference
appears to be in the second edition of William Andrews’s casebook,
Federal Income Taxation of Corporate Transactions.5 He floated the
idea in the notes following Focht v. Commissioner.6 In Focht, a cashmethod shareholder transferred accounts payable to a controlled
corporation in a transaction qualifying for nonrecognition under
§ 351.7 The question was whether the payables constituted “liabilities”
under § 357(c).8 This question was crucial: the value of the payables
outstripped the shareholder’s basis in the contributed assets, so if the
payables were liabilities, gain would result. The Tax Court
disregarded the plain language of the statute and found that the
payables were not liabilities.9
Andrews followed his analysis of the case with a question:
“Would it help in Focht if there were some concept akin to basis for
liabilities?”10 He answered the question by sketching out the useful
role such a concept would serve in accounting for transactions that
involve liability shifts and discharges.11 He also presaged doctrinal
developments relating to the concept, including the addition of

4. Perhaps the most well-known conceptual mistake of this type was made by the
Tax Court in Helmer v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (1975) (holding that a short option
was not a “liability” for purposes of § 752). The holding in this case was the linchpin of the
infamous Son-of-BOSS tax shelter. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-00-44.pdf [http://perma.cc/NB6V-ALML]. According to
IRS figures, over 1,800 taxpayers participated in Son-of-BOSS, and approximately $3.5
billion was collected in an IRS initiative to settle these cases. See I.R.S. News Release IR2005-37 (Mar. 24, 2005), https://www.irs.gov/uac/IRS-Collects-$3.2-Billion-from-Son-ofBoss%3B-Final-Figure-Should-Top-$3.5-Billion [https://perma.cc/ZM92-TG2D].
5. WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATE
TRANSACTIONS 183 (A. James Casner et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
6. Id.
7. Focht v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 223, 224–25 (1977).
8. Id. at 224. The case arose before the 1978 amendment that added § 357(c)(3). Pub.
L. No. 95-600, § 365, 92 Stat. 2763, 2854–55.
9. Focht, 68 T.C. at 227–29.
10. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 183.
11. Id.
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§§ 108(e)(2) and 357(c)(3), both of which are discussed at length
below.12
Three years later, in 1982, Wayne Barnett filed his well-known
amicus brief in Commissioner v. Tufts,13 which included reference to
the concept (with proper credit given to Andrews).14 Barnett argued
that just as taxpayers must keep track of prior expenditures relating
to an asset, so too must they keep track of “unaccounted-for prior
receipts with respect to a liability.”15 Barnett explained that on the
asset side the concept has a name—basis—which has statutory
imprimatur, so the need for the account is familiar and the conceptual
framework for determining and adjusting basis is well understood.16
Barnett argued that the cognate concept with respect to liabilities was
no less necessary to a well-functioning system but the necessity was
obscured by lack of a name.17
Exaggerating somewhat, Barnett claimed, “Andrews has
suggested that it can similarly be referred to simply as the taxpayer’s
‘basis’ for the liability.”18 As I read Andrews, he was not suggesting
that the term “basis” be assigned double duty (for both assets and
liabilities); rather, Andrews posited that the law would be improved if
everyone recognized the existence of “some [unnamed] concept akin
to basis for liabilities.”19 I have chosen “anti-basis” rather than
perpetuating Barnett’s suggested convention of referring to the
liability accounting concept as “basis” for the simple reason that the
name “basis” is already taken. Asking “basis” to do double duty for

12. See infra Sections III.B.1, III.B.3. Andrews also discussed the concept in his
article, On Beyond Tufts. He explained that the face amount of the debt in Crane and
Tufts
is exactly like basis except for its sign; it is a mirror image of asset basis. Just as
asset basis represents something spent but not yet deducted, the debt in Crane and
Tufts represents something received but not yet reflected in income. As such, it is
an element of the taxpayer’s tax history that needs to be taken into account . . . .
William D. Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 949, 954 (1983).
13. 461 U.S. 300 (1982).
14. Brief for Wayne G. Barnett as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 8,
Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (No. 81-1536) [hereinafter Barnett Brief]. This
amicus brief is well-known to tax lawyers and law students because it formed the basis for
the concurring opinion of Justice O’Connor in Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring), which is reproduced in most basic federal income tax casebooks.
15. Barnett Brief, supra note 14, at *4.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 183.
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historical accounting with respect to assets and liabilities would be
more confusing than using a different term.
There are a few other scattered references to the concept. The
most interesting of these, and the only one to use the term “antibasis” in print, is a 2008 article in Tax Notes.20 Calvin Johnson argued
in favor of closing what he referred to as “deferred revenue accounts”
by adding a new code section to mandate this result.21 Johnson
explained that the credit balance of a liability or deferred revenue
account can be referred to as “antibasis.”22 He gives credit for the
term to Wayne Barnett, acknowledging that, although Barnett did not
use the term “antibasis” in his Tufts amicus brief, the logic of the
concept is sketched out in the brief, and Barnett used the term
“antibasis” when teaching “a generation of his students at Stanford
Law School”23 (including Johnson). There is some minor overlap
between Johnson’s article and this one, but the thesis of Johnson’s
article is that a statutory clarification would be desirable (to shut
down a certain class of abusive tax shelters, in particular transactions
in which taxpayers seek to avoid including deferred income),24
whereas my goal is to explore anti-basis more fundamentally and
systematically.25
Some readers will wonder how anti-basis relates to negative
basis, sometimes referred to as subzero basis. Adjusted basis is the tax
accounting of a property owner’s after-tax net investment in some
unit of property.26 If investment exceeds disinvestment then basis is
positive. When things are flipped around, basis could—in concept—
go below zero. Under present law, however, when basis hits zero,
disinvestment is suspended or gain is triggered. For example,
depreciation deductions (tracking disinvestment) stop when basis hits
20. Calvin H. Johnson, Closing Deferred Revenue, 121 TAX NOTES 965, 967 (2008).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 967.
23. Id. at 967 n.9.
24. Id. at 969.
25. At least two practice treatises come close to recognizing anti-basis. Both treatises
recognize interrelationships among disparate doctrinal rules and that “similar principles”
run through these rules, but neither explores these principles in any systematic way. See 1
BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 4.05[3][f] (3d ed. 2003) (noting the conceptual link
between §§ 108(e)(2) and 357(c)(3)); see also WILLIAM S. MCKEE, WILLIAM F. NELSON &
ROBERT L. WHITMORE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS ¶¶
7.01–.05 (4th ed. 2007) (recognizing the connection between the partnership definition of
“liability” and cognate issues under Subchapter C, including situations implicating
§§ 357(c)(3) and 358(h)).
26. 2 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, & GIFTS ¶ 41.1 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 2].
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zero; in a transfer of encumbered assets to a controlled corporation in
a nonrecognition transaction under § 351, when the liabilities shifted
to the corporation are greater than the shareholder’s basis in the
contributed assets, § 357(c) requires the shareholder to report gain.
The gain reported under § 357(c) tops up the owner’s after-tax
investment in the property just enough to avoid negative basis. It
doesn’t have to be this way. Negative basis is an idea with a
respectable conceptual foundation and academic pedigree, but, again,
it has been ruled out doctrinally, except in very limited
circumstances.27
Viewed in this way, negative basis is just the natural extension of
tax basis beyond the (artificial) zero bound, not a conceptually
distinct idea. Anti-basis, in contrast, is an entirely distinct idea.
Indeed, as I describe in the next Part, anti-basis is the polar opposite
of basis.
II. GENERAL DEFINITION AND TEST
Anti-basis is a largely unacknowledged tax accounting concept.
Anti-basis measures and tracks the untaxed benefit that a taxpayer
enjoys as a concomitant of an increase in the liabilities (or
obligations) to which the taxpayer is subject. Anti-basis is the polar
opposite of tax basis: tax basis measures costs, anti-basis measures
benefits; tax basis is always associated with an asset, anti-basis is
always associated with a liability.
To test whether there is anti-basis associated with a particular
liability, ask whether payment of the liability would be nondeductible
and noncapital (that is, not capitalized into basis). If the answer is that
paying the liability is both nondeductible and noncapital, the liability
has anti-basis. If, on the other hand, paying the liability either
generates a deduction or increases tax basis, the liability lacks antibasis.
The reason this test works is that it sorts cases into two types: (a)
cases where the taxpayer has already enjoyed a benefit related to the
liability (yes anti-basis); and (b) cases where the benefit has not yet
accrued (no anti-basis). In the business context, the benefit will be a
tax attribute, either a deduction or an increase in tax basis. In the
personal context, the benefit will be either an increase in tax basis or

27. See generally George Cooper, Comment, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1352
(1962) (“exploring many of the major negative basis problems”). One area where negative
basis exists in present law is the consolidated return regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.150219(a)(2)(ii) (2015).
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consumption. In both contexts, when a benefit has already accrued
but the liability that generated the benefit has not yet been
discharged, it is necessary to keep track of the benefit that was
enjoyed prior to payment of the liability so that the benefit can be
reversed if the liability is discharged or somehow sidestepped without
payment. When the benefit associated with a liability has not yet been
taken into account, however, there is nothing to reverse if the liability
is discharged or shifted without payment, and hence there is no antibasis.
As I mentioned in Part I, the paradigmatic example of a liability
with anti-basis is a bank loan. The borrower is subscribing to an assetliability package comprised of loan proceeds and a commitment to
repay principal in the future. The loan proceeds have basis equal to
the amount borrowed, and the commitment to repay—the liability—
has anti-basis in the same amount. Confirm this by applying the
suggested test: Would payment of the liability give rise to a
deduction? Here the answer is no; ergo the liability has anti-basis.
A basic counterexample involves a liability for some amount that
the taxpayer is bound to pay as a matter of law but which has not yet
ripened into a deduction. For instance, suppose the taxpayer, a
shopkeeper, is the defendant in a slip-and-fall tort suit brought by a
customer injured in the taxpayer’s shop. The claim against the
shopkeeper has been resolved—meaning the legal liability has been
established for a known amount—but the claim has not been paid.
The claim is not yet deductible, but it will be when it is paid.28
Because the claim is deductible, there is no anti-basis.
Sometimes a claim begins without anti-basis and then acquires
anti-basis as time goes by. Consider our shopkeeper’s liability related
to purchasing inventory. The shopkeeper’s ability to claim a
deduction must wait until “economic performance” occurs, which is
generally when the inventory is delivered.29 Thus, if we suppose, for
example, that the shopkeeper agreed to purchase some minimum
quantity of inventory over a certain term from one of its suppliers, the
shopkeeper’s obligation to live up to the terms of the contract (a
“liability” in my usage) came into existence at the inception of the
contract, but lacked anti-basis at inception. Later, when the supplier
28. No deduction is permitted yet without regard to the shopkeeper’s method of
accounting. If the shopkeeper is on the cash method, the deduction is deferred until
payment. If the taxpayer is on the accrual method, the deduction is deferred until
economic performance occurs. In this case, economic performance occurs when payment
is made. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(C)(ii).
29. See § 461(h)(2)(A)(ii).
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delivered inventory to the taxpayer and economic performance
occurred, the liability acquired anti-basis in an amount equal to the
accrued deduction.
The test for and definition of anti-basis sometimes (at least
apparently) contradict each other. This occurs, for instance, when the
taxpayer never received a benefit with respect to a given liability, yet
would be denied a deduction (or other favorable tax attribute) if the
liability were paid. In cases of this type, the test suggests the existence
of anti-basis, the definition suggests the opposite.
Consider a fine for breaking the law. Say our shopkeeper’s sign
was larger than the local zoning law permits. If the shopkeeper pays a
fine, no deduction is allowed.30 If having a larger sign earned the shop
more income, the incremental income would be taxed; hence there
would be no “untaxed benefit,” which, under the definition, is
necessary to the existence of anti-basis. Yet payment of the fine
would not give rise to a deduction owing to the statutory rule
precluding deductions for fines and penalties.31 Thus the test implies
that there is anti-basis.
In cases of this sort, the contradiction between definition and test
is evidence of tension between fundamental theoretical concepts, such
as the meaning of income under the Haig-Simons conception, or some
other ideal,32 and present-law rules such as § 162(f).33 Results of the
definition and test diverge because theory and doctrine diverge. How
one mediates conflicts of this sort depends on the goal of the analysis
at hand. If the goal is accurately to account for theoretical concepts
then the test can be rewritten so it is in harmony with the definition.34
Alternatively, if the goal is to conform the definition of anti-basis
to existing law, then the conflict between the general definition and

30. § 162(f).
31. Id.
32. 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, & GIFTS ¶ 3.1.1 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 1]
(“Among contemporary American economists, the so-called Haig-Simons definition of
‘income’ is the most widely accepted: ‘Personal income may be defined as the algebraic
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in
question,” (quoting HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938))).
33. I.R.C. § 162(f) (precluding deduction for fines and penalties).
34. To mesh with Haig-Simons, the test would take the following form: would the
liability in question give rise to a deduction (or be capitalized into basis) under a set of
rules designed to implement a system conforming to the Haig-Simons ideal? If yes, then
no anti-basis, and conversely.
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the test will persist and the test must be given precedence.35 Little
damage is done to the usefulness of anti-basis by the existence of
cases of this type; indeed, anti-basis is useful precisely because it helps
to identify instances where the present-law rules and general concepts
are pulling in opposite directions, which has been a fixture of taxpolicy scholarship for decades.36
The problem of mediating theoretical purity and fidelity to
present-law rules arises for other fundamental concepts in tax, not
just anti-basis. Take a taxpayer who purchases IBM stock for $100
and sells in one year for $110. During the year, inflation was 4%. How
much income does the taxpayer have? The answer is the excess of
$110 over the taxpayer’s basis in her IBM stock, which is either $100
(under present law)37 or $104 (if tax basis were indexed for inflation).
Everyone who has considered the question agrees that if the capital
gains tax were indexed for inflation, the change would be
implemented through an adjustment to tax basis.38 Everyone agrees,
moreover, that the failure to index basis under present law results in
systematic mismeasurement of real income.39 Whether one formulates
the definition of basis as under present law (basis equals historical
cost simpliciter) or with indexing (basis equals historical cost adjusted
periodically for inflation) depends on the objective. The existence of
more than one plausible objective does not undermine the existence
or usefulness of the concept of tax basis, even though the concept
takes different forms in service of different objectives. So it is with
anti-basis.

35. If the goal is to conform to present law, it is conceivable (but not realistic) that the
general definition could be modified so that it would in all cases match the output of the
test. The difficulty with this approach is that the test is, by its nature, both concise and
sensitive to the innumerable special rules under present law. In contrast, the special rules
under present law would have to be written into the definition one-by-one. The definition
would quickly become so unwieldy that it would be useless in explaining or understanding
the basic underlying concept.
Articulating the concept in terms of the test, without an accompanying definition, is
the approach taken by the partnership tax rules implemented in 2005, as discussed below.
See infra Section IV.E.
36. See, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 175–76 (1973)
(discussing the difficulties in tax-policy reform).
37. I.R.C. § 1012.
38. See, e.g., VITO TANZI, INFLATION AND THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 27–28 (1980); Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48
TAX L. REV. 537, 548 (1993); Emil M. Sunley, Indexing the Income Tax for Inflation, 32
NAT’L TAX J. 328, 328 (1979).
39. See sources cited supra note 38.
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III. BASIC EXAMPLES
Liabilities can be categorized according to whether the claim is
fixed or contingent and, further, whether payment would give rise to a
deduction (or be capitalized into basis)40 when paid or accrued. To
demonstrate the existence and usefulness of anti-basis I will consider
four basic liability types: (A) fixed, nondeductible; (B) fixed,
deductible; (C) contingent; and (D) noncapital, nondeductible. For
each category, I will explain the conventional doctrine regarding the
treatment of the obligor and then explain how the doctrine can be
reformulated—or, in some instances, should be revised—to reflect the
presence or absence of anti-basis.
A. Fixed, Nondeductible Liabilities
1. Discharged by Payment
Under the conventional understanding, loan proceeds are not
taxable income when received by the borrower on the theory that the
borrower is no richer. The borrower’s obligation to repay the loan
decreases the borrower’s wealth by an amount that offsets the wealth
increase from the loan proceeds. It follows that repayment is
nondeductible. Repayment is costly to the borrower from a cash flow
standpoint, but repayment extinguishes the obligation to repay and,
hence, is not costly, all things considered.41
The tax consequences of this transaction can be explained using
anti-basis. The borrower’s receipt of the loan proceeds—cash receipt
without income—generated anti-basis. When the loan is repaid, the
repayment is set off against and extinguishes the borrower’s anti-basis
in the liability. No deduction is permitted; if one were allowed, the tax
benefit of the deduction would duplicate the benefit of excluding the
loan proceeds from income at the inception of the loan.
Just as tax basis is always associated with some asset owned by
the taxpayer, so too is anti-basis always associated with some liability
for which the taxpayer is responsible.42 Thus, extinguishing a liability
40. An expense is deductible in the sense that the expense either gives rise to a
deduction presently or is capitalized into basis that can be recovered at some later time;
likewise, “nondeductible” refers to costs that generate neither deductions nor basis.
Current deductions and capital expenditures will be explicitly distinguished when the
context requires.
41. TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 1, supra note 32, ¶ 6.1; William D. Popkin, The
Taxation of Borrowing, 56 IND. L.J. 43, 43 (1980).
42. The liability might be an encumbrance on the taxpayer’s property but not be a
liability of the taxpayer personally, as is true for nonrecourse debt. The tax treatment of
nonrecourse debt is examined below. See infra Section IV.C.
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necessarily implies that anti-basis associated with the liability, if it
exists, will be extinguished too.
2. Cancelled by the Creditor
Under the conventional understanding, if the lender cancels
some or all of the debt—for example by accepting partial or no
repayment in satisfaction of the borrower’s original commitment—the
borrower will have COD income equal to the excess of the original
amount lent over the amount repaid, if any. The prevailing theory
explaining this outcome is related to the treatment of the borrower
when the loan proceeds were transferred to the borrower. The
borrower didn’t have income because of the expectation that the
borrower would live up to her obligation to repay the loan. When the
borrower defaults, it is necessary to correct the tax accounting for the
loan transaction because the future did not unfold as expected.43
Again, the result can be explained using anti-basis. As noted
above, because the liability is being extinguished, any associated antibasis must also be extinguished. The anti-basis is extinguished by
payment to the extent thereof, and the balance is converted into
COD income. To state things more directly, the borrower’s COD
income equals the excess of anti-basis over the amount repaid to the
lender, if any.44
3. Transferred in Asset Sale
Under the conventional understanding, if an asset (Blackacre)
secures a loan and the asset is sold to a buyer who takes ownership
subject to the lender’s claim, the seller (the original borrower)
includes the amount of the loan in her amount realized.45 The buyer
gets tax basis for the price paid, including the portion of the purchase
price paid in the form of debt assumption.46

43. See TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 1, supra note 32, ¶¶ 7.1–7.7 (discussing income
from a discharge of indebtedness); Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Income
From the Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1165 (1978). The theory explaining COD income identified in the
text is referred to as the “prevailing theory” because there is another theory that has some
judicial support, but is widely regarded as defective: the “freeing of assets” theory, which
can be traced back to Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174–75 (1926). The
(dubious) continuing vitality of the freeing of assets theory is discussed in Taxation of
Income vol. 1, supra note 32, ¶ 7.1.
44. See supra Table 1.
45. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 6–14 (1947).
46. I.R.C. § 1012.

94 N.C. L. REV. 485 (2016)

498

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

The buyer does not get a deduction if she repays the loan as
expected.47 The buyer has already been given basis in Blackacre on
account of the loan. To give the buyer a deduction for paying this
same liability would be double counting. The buyer should, however,
be permitted to deduct interest paid on the loan.
A useful way to think about these rules—useful analytically and
also because it has been endorsed by the Supreme Court—is to
imagine an alternative transaction in which the buyer purchases
Blackacre purely for cash (no debt assumption), and the parties find
themselves in identical commercial positions immediately following
the sale. These results would follow if (a) the buyer took out a new
loan from the original lender in the amount of the outstanding loan to
the original borrower-seller, (b) the buyer transfers to the seller the
proceeds of this loan plus the cash that was paid in the original
transaction, and (c) the seller uses a portion of the sales proceeds to
repay her loan.48
In net effect, the buyer, seller, and lender all wind up in the same
positions after this more arduous, three-step transaction. In other
words, the two transactions being compared are commercial
substitutes. To avoid giving preference to form over substance, and
the resulting inefficient tax planning, it is desirable that the
transactions be taxed the same. So they are under present law.
An unstated assumption in the example to this point is that the
interest rate is a market rate at the time of the sale (so there is no
bond premium or market discount). If this assumption is false,
everything is much more complicated conceptually. Present law
largely ignores the important issues raised by premium and discount
liabilities. I discuss these issues below.49
Explained using anti-basis, the seller’s amount realized equals
both the sales proceeds received from the buyer and the seller’s antibasis in the liability shifted to the buyer. The buyer’s cost basis in
Blackacre equals the cash paid plus the face amount of the liability
shifted from seller to buyer. Because the shifted liability generates
asset basis for the buyer, the liability has anti-basis in the buyer’s
47. Macgruder v. Supplee, 316 U.S. 394, 398 (1942) (“Payment by a subsequent
purchaser is not the discharge of a burden which the law has placed on him, but is actually
as well as theoretically a payment of purchase price . . . . ”).
48. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 312 (1983) (“From the [seller’s] point of view,
when his obligation is assumed by a third party who purchases the encumbered property,
it is as if the [seller] first had been paid with cash borrowed by the [buyer] from the
mortgagee on a nonrecourse basis, and then had used the cash to satisfy his [own]
obligation to the mortgagee.”).
49. See infra Section IV.B.
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hands. The buyer gets no deduction on payment of the principal
amount of the liability (which, if allowed, would be a windfall
considering the liability shift generated asset basis). The buyer does,
however, get a deduction for interest paid on the liability.
4. Transferred to Controlled Corporation
Continue the example with a loan that encumbers Blackacre.
Assume, however, that rather than selling Blackacre in an arm’s
length transaction, the owner contributes Blackacre to a corporation
she controls in a transaction qualifying for nonrecognition under
§ 351. The shareholder does not have to treat the liability shift to the
corporation as cash received, contrary to the usual rule applicable to
taxable sales.50 As illustrated above, in a taxable asset sale the
principal amount of the loan shifted to the buyer forms a part of the
seller’s amount realized, akin to the receipt of cash.51 Departing from
this logic for transfers to controlled corporations is justified by the
idea that triggering boot gain on contributions of encumbered
property would frustrate the goal of removing tax impediments to
corporations.52 But the departure necessitates a basis reduction in the
shareholder’s shares by the amount of the liability assumed.53
Otherwise the shareholder would enjoy a windfall.
To make this concrete, assume Blackacre, worth $10, is security
for a bank loan worth $3. The contributing shareholder’s basis in
Blackacre prior to the contribution is $4. Blackacre is contributed in
exchange for stock worth $7 (Blackacre’s net value considering the
bank loan). The shareholder takes a basis in her shares of $1, equal to
her basis in Blackacre less the liabilities shifted to the corporation.
Compare the taxpayer’s positions before and after the contribution:

50. § 357(a) (reversing the rule in United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 565 (1938));
see Stanley S. Surrey, Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges, 50 YALE L.J. 1,
14–15 (1940).
51. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
52. 1 BORIS BITTKER & JAMES EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 3.06[1] (7th ed. 2014).
53. § 358(a)(1)(A)(ii), (d)(1).
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Table 2: Transfer to Controlled Corporation
Fixed, nondeductible liability
Taxpayer’s position before the
contribution: direct ownership
of Blackacre
Blackacre value
10

Taxpayer’s position after the
contribution: indirect ownership
of Blackacre
Stock value
7

Basis

4

Stock basis

1 (4 – 3)

Bank loan

3

Bank loan

0

Net value

7 (10 – 3)

Net value

7

Unrealized gain

6 (10 – 4)

Unrealized gain

6 (7 – 1)

As this example illustrates, the value of the stock the shareholder
receives is the net value she transfers to the corporation. If the
shareholder took a basis in her stock equal to her basis in Blackacre
($4), her unrealized gain would shrink by $3, the value of the liability
transferred (unrealized gain would drop from $6 to $3). This would be
a coherent result if the $3 liability shift were treated as boot and
triggered tax on $3 of the shareholder’s precontribution gain. As
explained above, however, liability assumptions are generally not
treated as boot in transfers to controlled corporations.54
Suppose, alternatively, that the principal balance on the bank
loan shifted to the corporation were $5, rather than $3. In this case
the rules just illustrated break down. Under these rules the liability
shift is not considered boot and the shareholder’s basis in her stock is
her basis in the contributed property reduced by shifted liabilities.
Thus, she would end up with a basis of negative $1 ($4 less $5). At
least in this context, there is nothing wrong in theory with assigning a
negative basis to the shareholder’s shares, but the rules are designed
to prevent this.55 In particular, there is an exception to the rule that
liability shifts are not boot; when shifted liabilities exceed the basis of
transferred assets, the excess is treated as boot.56 In this case, the
liability shift would result in a basis reduction of $3 (from $3 to $0, a
reduction in basis “to the extent thereof”) and boot gain for the
remainder of $1.
54. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
56. See § 357(c).
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Here, for the first time, restating present doctrine using anti-basis
simplifies things dramatically. The shareholder’s basis in her shares is
her basis in the asset transferred reduced by her anti-basis in the
liabilities shifted, leaving her with a basis in her stock equal to her
precontribution gain in the transferred property. In the first example
sketched out above, the shareholder’s asset basis was $4 and her antibasis in shifted liabilities was $3, so her stock basis is $4 – $3 = $1. In
the alternative, anti-basis in shifted liabilities ($5) outstrips stock basis
($4) in transferred assets, and the shareholder has gain equal to the $1
difference. The use of anti-basis simply and elegantly accounts for the
boot gain that is, under current law, the result of an ad hoc exception
to a general rule.
B.

Fixed, Deductible Liabilities

To illustrate the treatment of fixed, deductible liabilities under
present law and using anti-basis, suppose that, rather than a bank
loan, the liability is a tort liability of the owner of Blackacre.
Blackacre is rented out for use as a playground. A child was injured
when she fell and landed on a large rock that the owner should have
removed. Although the liability is fixed and determinable,57 it is not
yet deductible because it has not yet been paid.58
If and when the liability is paid, the tax consequence is a
deduction. This is so straightforward that thinking about the
transaction using anti-basis is counterproductive. Thinking about the
transaction as a liability realization, however, confirms that anti-basis
logic is compatible with basic doctrine.59 Things are considerably
more interesting, however, if the liability is cancelled by the creditor
or transferred to another taxpayer, such as an arm’s length buyer or
controlled corporation.

57. Those versed in tax accounting will recognize this as the test for deductibility by
an accrual method taxpayer, taken to mean that the legal obligation is fixed and the
amount can be determined with reasonable accuracy. See § 461(h)(4). In 1984 this test was
codified and embellished so that in addition to meeting the fixed and determinable
standard, economic performance must also occur before a deduction may be accrued.
§ 461(h)(1).
58. If the taxpayer is an accrual method taxpayer, the deduction must await payment
because payment constitutes economic performance. See § 461(h)(2)(C) and sources cited
supra note 57. If the taxpayer is on the cash method of accounting, then deduction is not
permitted until payment. See 5 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 105.3.4 (3d ed. 2000).
59. See supra Table 1, for the basis–anti-basis analogy and its link to realization
doctrine.
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1. Cancelled by the Creditor
Section 108(e)(2) provides that COD income does not arise “to
the extent that payment of the liability would have given rise to a
deduction.”60 This rule requires the taxpayer to consider the
counterfactual, “if I paid this liability that is being cancelled, would I
get a deduction?” If, as in our example, the answer is “yes,” then no
COD income results.
Section 108(e)(2) was added to the Code in the Bankruptcy Tax
Act of 1980.61 The rationale for this rule is described obliquely in the
legislative history as relating to “ ‘lost’ deductions.”62 The House
Report includes a useful example that clarifies the basic premise:
“[A]ssume a cash-basis taxpayer owes $1,000 to its cash-basis
employee as salary and has not actually paid such amount. If later the
employee forgives the debt . . . then the discharge [would] not give
rise to income or require any reduction of tax attributes.”63
In the example, two aspects of the debtor’s tax position change
when a deductible debt is cancelled, and they offset one another.
First, there is the debt cancellation, which normally generates gross
income. Second, the taxpayer loses the deduction that would have
been permitted if the debt had been paid. The lost deduction exactly
equals the gross income resulting from nonpayment. Because these
amounts are equal and offsetting, there is no effect on net income.64
The counterfactual inquiry required by § 108(e)(2) is the same as
the test for anti-basis, articulated above. Thus, this is the first example
we have seen where present law clearly (though tacitly) incorporates
anti-basis. If payment of the liability would give rise to a deduction,
then the liability has zero anti-basis. If anti-basis is zero, then no
income should arise if the debt is cancelled by the creditor.
What happens if payment of a cancelled liability would
(counterfactually, if not cancelled) be classified as a capital
expenditure, rather than a deductible cost? The statute does not
address this situation, and I find no cases or rulings addressing the
question. In an analogous context involving corporate tax, discussed
below, the Treasury concluded in a published ruling that “the same
principle applies to liabilities that give rise to capital expenditures.”65
Anti-basis logic confirms this approach. If the taxpayer would
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

I.R.C. § 108(e)(2).
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389.
H.R. REP. NO. 96-883, at 16 (1980).
S. REP. No. 96-1035, at 20 (1980).
BITTKER ET AL., supra note 26, ¶ 4.05[3][e].
Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36; see also infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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(counterfactually) be entitled to capitalize the cost corresponding to
the liability into basis, then anti-basis must be zero. Just as with
deductible liabilities, if anti-basis is zero then no income should arise
on cancellation.
2. Transferred in Asset Sale
Return to the example involving Blackacre, a misplaced rock,
and an injured child. If Blackacre is sold to a buyer who agrees to
assume the seller’s obligation to pay the tort judgment, the tax
consequences are well settled but more intricate than in prior
examples.
The seller’s amount realized equals the sum of the cash received
from the buyer plus the value of the tort liability assumed by the
buyer. The seller is deemed to make a payment on the liability (a
fiction), which triggers the seller’s ability to claim a deduction.66 The
buyer is given basis credit for the cash actually paid and also for the
liability assumed (or, equivalently, for the sum of the cash the buyer
actually pays plus the cash she notionally pays).67 The buyer is not
permitted to claim a deduction when she satisfies the liability. A
deduction is denied to the buyer when she pays the tort claim, even
though it would have been permitted to the seller if the seller had
paid the claim, because the buyer is given basis credit for assuming
the liability, and allowing a deduction in addition to this tax basis
would be double counting.68
To make this concrete, suppose Blackacre is worth $10, has a tax
basis of $6 in the seller’s hands, and that the liability to the victim is
worth $3. If Blackacre were sold in a taxable transaction, the seller’s
amount realized would be $10 ($7 cash received plus $3 liability
shifted to the buyer), resulting in gain of $4 ($10 amount realized less
$6 tax basis).69 Meanwhile, the seller would get a deduction for the
66. James M. Pierce Corp. v. Comm’r, 326 F.2d 67, 69 (8th Cir. 1964); Commercial
Sec. Bank v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 145, 149 (1981) (“[B]y accepting less cash for its assets in
exchange for the assumption of its liabilities, [the seller] effectively paid the accrued
liabilities at the time of the sale.”); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(5) (2015) (declaring an
exception to the economic performance prerequisite for deduction accrual when, in the
sale of a business, the shifted liability is included in the seller’s amount realized).
67. TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 2, supra note 25, ¶ 41.2.2; cf. Crane v. Comm’r, 331
U.S. 1, 14 (1947) (noting the reality that a buyer of property subject to a mortgage must
treat the mortgage as if it were his own personal obligation because he would realize a
benefit if the mortgage were discharged); Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(g) (2015) (“[I]f a debt
instrument is issued in exchange for property, the cost of the property that is attributable
to the debt instrument is the issue price of the debt instrument . . . . ”).
68. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
69. I.R.C. § 1001(a), (b); Crane, 331 U.S. at 14.
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“payment” of the $3 liability, leaving net income of $1.70 The net
income might be a composite of capital gains and ordinary
deductions, given that the $4 gain might be classified as a capital
gain,71 whereas the $3 deduction for the tort liability would probably
be set off against ordinary income.72
The buyer’s basis in Blackacre would be $10, the combination of
cash paid by and liability shifted to the buyer. The buyer wouldn’t get
to deduct the $3 liability when payment was ultimately made to the
tort victim. If, however, interest has accrued on the obligation to the
tort victim after the sale but before the tort victim is paid, the interest
will be deductible by the buyer, just as interest on the bank loan
encumbering Blackacre would have been deductible by the buyer.
Post-purchase interest was not consideration paid to the seller of
Blackacre for the property, but a time charge imposed on the buyer in
the first instance, and one for which the buyer has received no
favorable tax attributes.
Now think about the transaction using anti-basis. The act of
selling Blackacre cum liability imposes a cash cost on the seller—
foregone sales proceeds attributable to the liability shift. Incurring
this cost triggers the seller’s ability to claim the deduction. This
deduction, in turn, generates anti-basis in the liability. At this point,
given that the liability has anti-basis, the analysis degenerates into the
earlier, simpler case of a fixed, nondeductible obligation such as a
bank loan: The seller’s amount realized equals the cash received by
the seller plus anti-basis in liabilities shifted from seller to buyer.
From the buyer’s perspective, the assumption of a seller’s fixed
liability always generates tax basis in the acquired asset—and thus
anti-basis in the associated liability—so there is never any difference
between liabilities that would and those that would not have been
deductible by the seller. The buyer never gets a deduction when she
pays the liability.
There is a complication worth discussing. The example used to
illustrate the present law treatment of fixed, deductible liabilities was
chosen with care. I purposefully chose an example that did not
involve surrogate taxation—the practice of denying one party to a
transaction a deduction for an expense of a type ordinarily deductible
because the other party to the transaction is not required to report

70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71. This will be true if Blackacre is a “capital asset” under § 1221, or is treated as a
capital asset under § 1231.
72. See § 165 (permitting deduction for losses).
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the corresponding income. Deferred compensation is the classic
example.73
Suppose, in a world of uniform 40% tax rates and 10% pre-tax
returns, an employee renders services at time 0 worth $100. In lieu of
$100 of current compensation, the employer promises to pay the
employee $106 at time 1.74 The now familiar tax policy insight is that,
for income to be measured accurately, the employer can be allowed
(a) a deduction of $100 at time 0 or (b) a deduction of $106 at time 1,
$106 being the future value equivalent (at time 1) of a $100 payment
at time 0. But if the employer is allowed a deduction of $100 at time 0,
it may not be permitted to deduct the $6 increment between the
amount of its deduction and the ultimate payment. This would result
in a windfall to the employer.75
Now suppose that the liability transferred with Blackacre is not a
tort liability but rather this deferred compensation obligation. So it
will mesh with the attributes assigned to Blackacre in the running
example (market value $10, seller basis $4)—assume the deferred
compensation obligation is for $3 (time 0 value, as of the sale), which
is equivalent to $3 × $1.06 = $3.18 (time 1 value, when payment is due
to the employee). If the buyer purchases Blackacre for total
consideration of $10 ($7 cash plus $3 of liability assumption) some
aspects of the tax treatment are clear and others are unsettled. It is
clear that the seller’s amount realized is $10, so gain is $6. It is also
clear that the buyer’s basis is $10. The unsettled questions are, first,
whether the seller gets a compensation deduction at the time of the
sale and, second, whether the buyer may deduct (or claim additional
basis for) the $0.18 time value increment that is the difference
between the value of the debt at the time of the sale ($3) and when
the buyer pays the employee ($3.18).
The answer to the first question—deductibility by the seller—is
that the seller should in concept be allowed a $3 deduction but is
denied a deduction under present law. As noted above, the
regulations governing accrual of deductions deem economic
performance—usually the gating item for deductibility by the seller—
to be satisfied when the seller includes the transferred liability in her

73. See generally Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the “Time Value of
Money”, 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986) (exploring transactions designed to avoid taxation as a
mechanism to understand the time value of money).
74. This example is taken from Daniel Halperin, Assumption of Contingent Liabilities
on Sale of a Business, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 673, 678–81 (1996).
75. Id. at 678–83.

94 N.C. L. REV. 485 (2016)

506

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

amount realized.76 In the context of employee compensation,
however, § 404(a)(5) supersedes this regulation.77 Section 404(a)(5)
delays the deduction for deferred compensation paid by an accrual
method taxpayer until the employee is required to include the
income.78 Some commentators believe that the seller may claim a
deduction at the time of the sale under present law, but even the most
optimistic acknowledge that this position carries considerable risk of a
successful IRS challenge.79 Delaying the seller’s deduction is
unwarranted as a matter of policy, and the statutory rule should be
modified to permit the deduction.80
The second question—deductibility of the $0.18 difference
between the time value of the liability when it is assumed and when it
is paid—implicates anti-basis. Surrogate taxation of the employee
requires that no deduction be permitted to the buyer for the $0.18.
Thinking through this question using anti-basis, however, suggests a
different answer. If the buyer is only given basis credit of $3 on
account of the liability assumption, the implication is that the buyer’s
anti-basis is $3. Payment of any greater sum should give rise to a
deduction of the excess. If no deduction is permitted, the implication
is that the buyer has anti-basis of $3.18, rather than $3. An anti-basis
of $3.18, in turn, implies that the buyer’s basis in Blackacre should be
$10.18, rather than $10.
The apparent contradiction between the results—consistency
with surrogate taxation on the one hand and proper accounting for
anti-basis on the other—is illusory. The $0.18 deduction is denied to
the buyer because the seller should have been permitted to deduct the
$3 liability at time 0, which amounts to a complete tax accounting for
the claim based on its value at that time. Allowing the buyer a further
deduction for the difference between the time 0 and time 1 value of
the claim would replicate part of the seller’s deduction. This is the
correct justification for denying the buyer a deduction for the $0.18.
The buyer’s anti-basis in the liability—and the corresponding portion
of asset basis in Blackacre—is simply $3, just as with the tort liability.

76. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
77. § 404(a)(5).
78. See id.
79. Robert H. Wellen, Contingent Consideration and Contingent Liabilities in
Acquisitions, 45 WM. & MARY ANN. TAX CONF. li, 24 (1999); see also MARTIN D.
GINSBURG, JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND
BUYOUTS ¶ 304.3 (Mar. 2014 ed.) (referring to the Service’s position that no deduction is
permitted to the seller as “ridiculous”).
80. In this regard I agree with Halperin. See Halperin, supra note 74, at 710.
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To further illustrate the point, consider that deferred
compensation obligations accrue interest at after-tax rates, whereas
tort judgments accrue interest at before-tax rates (this is true in
theory, if not in practice).81 If this is true here, the buyer of Blackacre
who takes the property and the tort judgment must set aside $3 to
satisfy her obligation to the tort victim at time 1, considering the
assumed 10% yield on the set aside and the corresponding deduction
for interest paid on the judgment.82 The buyer of Blackacre subject to
the deferred compensation obligation must likewise set aside $3
considering the assumed 6% yield on the set aside and the lack of any
corresponding deduction for interest paid on the deferred
compensation.83
3. Contributed to Controlled Corporation
The rules governing shifts of fixed, deductible liabilities to a
controlled corporation in a nonrecognition transaction are well
settled. Unfortunately they are also complicated. Let’s begin with the
playground-tort judgment variation of the running example, using the
same values and tax attributes (Blackacre is worth $10, the owner’s
tax basis in Blackacre is $4, and the liability to the victim is $3).
Consistent with the rule discussed above for shifts of fixed,
nondeductible liabilities to controlled corporations (illustrated using
the bank loan),84 the liability shift to the corporation in this case
would not be treated as boot, but contrary to that earlier example, the
shareholder would not be required to reduce her stock basis on
account of the liability assumption. The facts and outcome under
current law are collated in the following table:

81. Even if this is false in practice, the distinction between deferred compensation
obligations and tort judgments should be true in principle, and my goal here is to thresh
out a conceptual understanding of the tax policy issues assuming the rest of the legal
system has a coherent structure. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 74, at 678–81
(demonstrating that an employer supplying a pre-tax rate of return is tantamount to
increasing the amount of deferred compensation).
82. Setting aside $3.00 will return $3.30, a pre-tax yield of $0.30, and payment will
generate a deduction of $0.30 (the excess of the $3.30 payment over the $3.00 anti-basis).
Thus there will be no net income on the set aside, which can be funded at time 0 for $3.00.
83. Setting aside $3.00 will return $3.30, a pre-tax yield of $0.30, and payment will
generate no deduction for the reasons described in the text. Thus the pre-tax yield will be
reduced to $0.30 × (1 – .4) = $0.18 after-tax, just enough to fund the $3.18 deferred
compensation obligation at time 1.
84. See supra Section III.A.4.

94 N.C. L. REV. 485 (2016)

508

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

Table 3: Transfer to a controlled corporation
Fixed, deductible liability
Shareholder’s position before
the contribution: direct
ownership of Blackacre
Blackacre value
10

Shareholder’s position after the
contribution: indirect ownership
of Blackacre
Stock value
7

Basis

4

Stock basis

4

Fixed, deductible
liability
Net value

3

0

7

Fixed, deductible
liability
Net value

Unrealized gain

6 (10 – 4)

Unrealized gain

3 (7 – 4)

Inchoate
net income
(unrealized gain
less inchoate
deduction)

3 (6 – 3)

Inchoate
net income
(unrealized gain
less inchoate
deduction)

3 (3 – 0)

7

The difference between this case and the earlier case involving a
transfer of a fixed, nondeductible liability is that the contributing
shareholder in this case exchanges her asset basis for her stock basis
without any reduction on account of the corporation’s assumption of
the fixed, deductible liability.85 In the earlier case, such a reduction was
required.86 A reduction in tax basis in the contributor’s stock is
required for nondeductible liabilities because the gain to be preserved
for future recognition is the difference between the unencumbered
value of Blackacre and the contributor’s tax basis in Blackacre; when
Blackacre is swapped for stock, the stock’s value equals the value of
Blackacre reduced by the liability shifted to the corporation. It follows
that the shareholder’s tax basis in the stock must be ratcheted down
by the amount of the liability. With this adjustment, the difference
between the value and tax basis of the contributor’s stock is the same
as the difference between the value and tax basis of Blackacre prior
to the contribution. In sum, a step down in stock basis equal to
liabilities shifted to the corporation replicates in the contributor’s

85. See I.R.C. §§ 357(c)(3), 358(d)(2).
86. See § 358(d)(1).
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stock (no more and no less than) the contributor’s precontribution
asset gain in Blackacre.
In the case of fixed, deductible liabilities, the contributor has
unrealized gain and also an inchoate deduction. In the example, the
gain and deduction net to $3 ($6 unrealized gain less $3 inchoate
deduction). If the contributor’s gain in Blackacre is replicated in her
shares without an accounting for the lost deduction, the outcome
would be punitive from the contributor’s point of view. She would go
from inchoate net income of $3 before the contribution to inchoate
net income of $6 afterwards. If she is not required to reduce her basis
in her shares on account of the liability shifted to the corporation,
then the contributor’s inchoate net income is the same after the
contribution as it was before. This is the correct outcome and is
required under present law.87
This rule treating liability shifts to controlled corporations
differently depending on whether they would give rise to a deduction
for the contributing shareholder tacitly incorporates anti-basis.88 In
other words, the more favorable result under present law for the tort
claim (compared with the bank loan) depends on the counterfactual
deductibility of the liability by the contributor. Thus, the test for antibasis is key to the operation of the rule.
It would be simpler to state the rules for liability shifts to
controlled corporations if the role of anti-basis in the analysis were
made explicit: if a liability shifted to a corporation has anti-basis (the
bank loan) then the contributor’s stock basis is the excess of basis in

87. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
88. Section 357(c)(3), which defines the scope of the rule, reads as follows:
(3) Certain liabilities excluded
(A) In general
If a taxpayer transfers, in an exchange to which section 351 applies, a
liability the payment of which either—
(i) would give rise to a deduction, or
(ii) would be described in section 736(a),
then, for purposes of paragraph (1), the amount of such liability shall be
excluded in determining the amount of liabilities assumed.
(B) Exception
Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to any liability to the extent that the
incurrence of the liability resulted in the creation of, or an increase in, the
basis of any property.
§ 357(c)(3).
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the contributed assets over anti-basis in shifted liabilities;89 if a
liability shifted to a corporation lacks anti-basis (the tort claim) then
the contributor’s stock basis is the same as the basis in the contributed
assets, not reduced by the liability shift.90
C.

Contingent Liabilities
1. The Problem

Unlike fixed liabilities that might be either nondeductible (e.g.,
bank loan) or deductible (e.g., tort liability), as a first approximation
all contingent liabilities are deductible.91 It is the nature of most
contingent liabilities that no value was received by the obligor at the
time the contingent liability arose. The tort claim in the earlier
example was a fixed, deductible liability because the claim by the
victim was resolved by settlement or judgment (making the liability
fixed and determinable, in tax jargon). The claim began, however, as
a contingent liability when the victim was injured and had a potential
cause of action against the owner of Blackacre. When the accident
happened, the owner of Blackacre received no value (no sum
analogous to the proceeds on the bank loan) correlating to the
liability. In general, there is no receipt of value correlating to
contingent liabilities when they arise. It follows that contingent
liabilities have zero anti-basis.
The tax treatment of contingent liabilities is straightforward
when the taxpayer originally liable remains liable through resolution
of the claim by payment, default, or a determination that no amount
is due. If the contingent liability is paid, then the taxpayer takes a
deduction when the liability is paid or accrued. There is no anti-basis
to absorb the payment as there is for nondeductible liabilities like the
bank loan. If the contingent liability has value but the taxpayer
defaults, there is no tax consequence. Recall that there is no COD
income on discharge of a liability with zero anti-basis.92 If it is
ultimately determined that no amount is due, evaporation of the
potential claim has no tax consequence. Essentially, in every case, the

89. If anti-basis in shifted liabilities is greater than basis in contributed assets, the
excess is gain and stock basis is zero. See § 357(c).
90. See §§ 357(c)(3), 358(d)(2).
91. There is a small class of contingent liabilities that are nondeductible (that is, have
anti-basis). An example is a contingent liability to pay a fine or penalty that is
nondeductible because of § 162(f). This class of liabilities is discussed below. See infra
Section IV.D.
92. See § 108(e)(2); see also supra Section III.B.1 (discussing § 108(e)(2)).
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passage of time resolves the contingency and the proper tax treatment
follows automatically.
On the other hand, when contingent liabilities are shifted—either
in an asset sale or a contribution to a controlled corporation—the tax
treatment of the liability shift is confused as a matter of doctrine.93
This is not surprising given that the underlying tax policy issues are
complicated in the abstract and become even more complicated when
administrative considerations are factored into rule design.
The fundamental issue is one of categorization. Contingent
liabilities lie on a continuum between fixed, deductible liabilities on
the one hand and potential future costs on the other. “Potential
future costs” refers to a category even more attenuated than
contingent liabilities. Everyone agrees that potential future costs
shifted in asset sales are (and should be) ignored in figuring the tax
consequences for both the seller and the buyer.94
The large number of articles and bar association reports
regarding the treatment of contingent liabilities represent a seemingly
interminable tug-of-war between (a) those who favor treating
contingent liabilities like fixed, deductible liabilities and (b) those
who favor treating contingent liabilities like potential future costs,
which is to say those who favor ignoring them.95 No commentator or
policymaker has, to my knowledge, raised the possibility of fashioning
a new regime applicable only to contingent liabilities.

93. An enormous literature exists on this subject. See, e.g., Charlotte Crane,
Accounting for Assumed Liabilities Not Yet Accrued by the Seller: Is a Buyer’s Deduction
Really Costless?, 48 TAX NOTES 225, 225–26 (1990); Charlotte Crane, More on Accounting
for the Assumption of Contingent Liabilities, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 615, 636–41 (1997)
[hereinafter Crane, More on Accounting]; Halperin, supra note 74, at 675; Kevin M.
Keyes, The Treatment of Liabilities in Taxable Asset Acquisitions, 50 INST. ON FED. TAX’N
§ 21.01, at 21–2 (1992); Richard L. Reinhold, New York State Bar Ass’n Tax Section,
Report on Federal Income Tax Treatment of Contingent Liabilities, 49 TAX NOTES 883, 884
(1990); Robert R. Wootton, Mrs. Logan’s Ghost: The Open Transaction Doctrine Today,
71 TAXES 725, 725 (1993); Alfred D. Youngwood, The Tax Treatment of Contingent
Liabilities in Taxable Asset Acquisitions, 44 TAX LAW 765, 782 (1991).
94. See, e.g., Crane, More on Accounting, supra note 93, at 636–37; Halperin, supra
note 74, at 700; Keyes, supra note 93, § 21.04[2][a][i]–[ii]; Wootton, supra note 93, at 740;
Youngwood, supra note 93, at 784–85.
95. Compare Halperin, supra note 74, at 700 (advocating for ignoring contingent
liabilities), with Youngwood, supra note 93, at 784–85 (arguing for granting a deduction
for the buyer “at the time the seller would have received the deduction had the sale not
taken place”). If option (a) is chosen, further specification is necessary: if accounting is
potentially required before the liability becomes fixed such accounting can be made based
on estimated values or instead can be deferred until valuation is established (a wait-andsee approach referred to as “open transaction” accounting).
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Assuming, consistent with the thrust of the debate, that these
three types of obligations are to be split into two groups, arbitrary line
drawing along the continuum is unavoidable. Anti-basis sheds no light
on where to draw the line. It is nevertheless useful to walk through
the permutations using anti-basis as a guide. Doing so highlights the
policy implications of the choice between available options.
2. Shifted in Asset Sale
To see what turns on the classification in a taxable asset sale,
recall the basic facts of the running example: Blackacre is worth $10
and the owner’s basis is $6. Now let’s suppose that due to the grading
of the Blackacre’s slope, water is running off the land and damaging
the neighbor’s property. The neighbor has a potential cause of action
against the owner of Blackacre. The neighbor’s claim relates to prior
events but the liability, if any, is not fixed and determinable. All
things considered, the contingent liability has an expected value of
$3.96
If Blackacre is sold for cash, the buyer will pay $7, assuming the
contingent liability follows the land. Assume initially that the
contingent liability is accounted for under the rules for fixed,
deductible liabilities. If the liability were accounted for at the time of
the sale rather than under a wait-and-see approach,97 the seller should
have total net income of $1, considering both gain and deductions.
Observe that the seller came to the transaction with property with a
built in gain of $10 – $6 = $4 and a liability representing an inchoate
tax deduction with an expected value of $3. Here is a summary:
Item

Amount

1. Cash received

7

2. Contingent liability shifted

3

3. Amount realized

10

4. Adjusted basis

6

5. Gain realized

4

Computation

line 1 + line 2

line 3 – line 4

96. By “all things considered” I mean the probable remedy, the likelihood of success,
the time value of money, and so forth.
97. See supra note 95; see also Wootton, supra note 93, at 738–42 (evaluating the
unsettled question of whether the transaction would be treated as closed or open under
present law).
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6. Deduction

3

line 2

7. Net income

1

line 5 – line 6

Accounting for the contingent liability as though it were fixed
means that the buyer’s basis in Blackacre will be $10. The buyer will
have anti-basis in the liability of $3. This anti-basis derives from the
$3 of tax basis in Blackacre generated by the liability assumption.
Permitting the buyer to claim this basis and to deduct the liability
when it comes due would be double counting; if the liability has antibasis no deduction is allowed, so there is no double counting.
If, instead, the contingent liability is ignored, then the seller’s
amount realized is the $7 cash received. Hence, gain is $7 – $6 = $1.
This is the same as the seller’s net income when the liability was
factored in; however, depending on the nature of the property and
taxpayer type, when the liability is factored into the amount realized
and deducted, there might be a character shift. Specifically, the
incremental gain might enjoy the capital gains rate preference,
whereas the deduction will set off ordinary income. Thus, for at least
some sellers, accounting for liability explicitly is better than ignoring
it.
If the contingent liability is ignored, the buyer takes a tax basis of
$7 in Blackacre—which is worse than the $10 tax basis under the
alternative characterization—but the buyer is now permitted to
deduct the liability when paid. The liability was consideration paid by
the buyer in an economic sense, but no basis credit was given to the
buyer; ergo, no anti-basis. This deduction is allowed if and when the
claim is paid and in the amount ultimately determined.
As a general proposition, whether buyers are helped or hurt by
one approach or the other depends on the relative pace of (a) the cost
recovery deductions the buyer would have been allowed if the
contingent claim were added to basis and (b) the deductions the
buyer is allowed when the contingent claim is paid. Given that the
amount deducted will be equal (at least in expectation) either way,
whichever results in earlier deduction is better. In our example,
ignoring the contingent claim unambiguously provides a benefit
because Blackacre is nondepreciable, but it could go either way in
other cases where the property is eligible for cost recovery
deductions.
Thus, sometimes the seller and buyer stand on opposite sides of
the issue with one preferring to account for the contingent liabilities
and the other preferring to ignore them. This would be true of an
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individual seller eligible for the preferential character flip (capital
gain and ordinary deduction) and a buyer, when, as with Blackacre,
the property is nondepreciable. If it is usually true that buyer and
seller have contradictory preferences, there is an argument—from a
practical standpoint—for treating contingent liabilities like fixed,
deductible liabilities since the parties’ competing interests will
encourage accurate valuation of contingent liabilities when
accounting for the transaction. This approach also avoids the hard
question of where to set the boundary between fixed, deductible
liabilities and contingent liabilities.98
If buyers and sellers do not ordinarily have conflicting interests
regarding valuation, then lumping contingent liabilities in with fixed,
deductible liabilities might open up avenues of abuse. Sellers and
buyers could conspire to lower their effective marginal tax rates by
exaggerating (or minimizing) the value assigned to contingent claims;
the only loser in the bargain would be the fisc.
3. Contributed to Controlled Corporation
To summarize current law, described above at length using
conventional terminology,99 the contributing shareholder’s stock basis
is the excess of her asset basis over her anti-basis (if any) in liabilities
shifted to the corporation.100 The recipient corporation takes a
transferred asset basis and liability anti-basis from the contributing
shareholder.101 To this extent, the rules make sense and usually work
well—they are clear, administrable, and well understood. With the
help of anti-basis, they are also easy to state.
I say these rules usually work well. They broke down in
spectacular fashion in the mid-1990s when several taxpayers tried to
exploit the rule that liabilities without anti-basis can be transferred to
a controlled corporation without ratcheting down the contributing
shareholder’s stock on account of the liability shift.102 In a
prototypical exploitative transaction, the shareholder (usually itself a
corporation) would contribute $100 of cash and $99 of contingent
98. Wootton, supra note 93, at 741 (noting the difficulty of distinguishing between
contingent and fixed liabilities).
99. See supra Sections III.A.4, III.B.3.
100. If anti-basis exceeds basis then § 357(c) gain results. I.R.C. § 357(c)(1).
101. § 358(a)(1).
102. See, e.g., WFC Holdings Corp. v. United States, 728 F.3d 736, 739–42 (8th Cir.
2013); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1343–45 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Black
& Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 433–34 (4th Cir. 2006). See generally Ethan
Yale, Reexamining Black & Decker’s Contingent Liability Tax Shelter, 108 TAX NOTES 223
(2005) (analyzing Black & Decker’s “contingent liability tax shelter”).
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(deductible) liabilities to a newly formed corporation in exchange for
stock. The contributing shareholder would then sell its stock for its
market value of $1 (equal to the $100 cash held by the corporation set
off by the $99 negative expected value of the contingent liabilities).
The contributing shareholder would argue that its basis in the stock
was $100—equal to its basis in the contributed cash not reduced by
the contingent deductible liabilities—and thus would claim a $99
loss.103
No reduction in share basis is required on account of the
liabilities shifted to the new corporation, the argument goes, because
under the plain terms of the Code, the shareholder is not required to
step down basis on account of deductible liability shifts.104 Later,
when the new corporation pays the liability, it is permitted a
deduction of $99, or the future value equivalent (assuming the
liability was valued accurately). The contributing shareholder argues
that the corporation’s deduction for the claim is correct under the
Service’s official position, articulated in a revenue ruling.105 Thus the
main benefit of the transaction is that it duplicates the tax benefit
inherent in the transferred liability.
In terms of anti-basis, why does the transferee corporation take
the contingent liability with anti-basis of zero? Put in conventional
terminology, why is it true that the transferee corporation may deduct
the contingent liability when it is paid or accrued? The reason to
doubt this is true is that if the liability were shifted to a buyer in a
taxable sale as part of an asset-liability package (like our Blackacre
examples), the buyer would count the liability shift as part of its cost
and factor this cost into its basis in the purchased assets. This, in turn,
implies the liability has anti-basis for the buyer-transferee and is
nondeductible. If the analysis is different for § 351 exchanges, one
would expect to find a persuasive rationale or legal authority—
hopefully both.
The rationale that has been offered by the Service for allowing
the transferee a deduction even though the shifted liability represents
part of its cost for the acquired property is “the specific congressional
intent of § 351(a) to facilitate the incorporation of an ongoing
business by making the incorporation tax free.”106 The Service has
concluded that this intent would be frustrated if liabilities that would
103. See I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-9 I.R.B. 730 (designating the “Contingent Liability
Tax Shelter” as a listed transaction).
104. See §§ 357(c)(3), 358(d)(2).
105. Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, 38.
106. Id.
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have been deducted by the transferor cannot be deducted by the
transferee.107 This might be true in some situations, but it is not selfevident.108
Importantly, the proffered rationale is emphatically not
convincing in the prototypical exploitative transaction sketched out
above. In that transaction, the taxpayer went into the § 351
transaction with an inchoate $99 deduction for the contingent liability
and walked out with a $99 built-in-loss in its subsidiary stock. The
built-in-loss is an adequate (indeed, seemingly perfect) substitute for
the inchoate deduction, and the contributor would not be impeded
from doing the transaction for nontax business reasons if the
transferee corporation were not permitted to deduct the liability.
The legal authority supporting the transferee-corporation’s
ability to deduct the contingent liability when it is paid or accrued is
Revenue Ruling 95-74, which articulates the (sometimes
unconvincing) rationale discussed above.109 The facts of the ruling
involve a taxpayer who contributes substantially all of the assets and
liabilities associated with a manufacturing business, including land
contaminated by hazardous waste.110 The obligation to remediate this
waste is the contingent liability shifted in the ruling.111 The ruling is
clear that the transfer of the manufacturing business (including the
contingent liability) is made “for bona fide business purposes”
unrelated to tax avoidance.112

107. Id.
108. There is another rationale supporting the conclusion that the recipient
corporation should not have anti-basis in the shifted liability, but it has not been raised
before to my knowledge. Although it is true that the liability shift is consideration paid by
the transferee corporation for the assets transferred, the transferee corporation gets no
basis credit for the liability shift. See § 362(b). Rather, basis transfers from the contributing
shareholder to the transferee corporation under § 362(b). If asset basis carries over, maybe
liability anti-basis should carry over too. This argument is conceptually sound: Asset basis
would be the benefit to the transferee from which anti-basis would derive, and here no
asset basis is created; however, this argument is not supported by the statute. See
Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 153 F.2d 323, 324–25 (8th Cir. 1946) (pointing out that
deductibility by the transferee even if theoretically appropriate would require statutory
support, which is lacking).
109. See Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, 38.
110. Id. at 36.
111. See id.
112. Id. Though the ruling is somewhat vague, a reasonable inference is that the
Service had in mind a transaction in which built-in-gain assets were being contributed
alongside the contingent liability so, in toto, as many or more gains were duplicated as
losses, so there was no net tax benefit.
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Case law does not support this ruling.113 In Holdcroft
Transportation Co. v. Commissioner,114 the Eighth Circuit held that
payments by a transferee corporation of liabilities that had been
shifted in a § 351 transaction were not deductible by the transferee
corporation even when they would have been deductible if they had
been paid or accrued by the transferor.115 The Holdcroft court
reasoned that assumption of the transferred liability was “part of the
consideration for the acquisition” by the transferee corporation of the
assets transferred, and must be accounted for as “part of the cost of
acquisition.”116 The court thus concluded that the transferee
corporation was not permitted to deduct the assumed liabilities when
paid.117 In terms of anti-basis, the court reasoned that the transferee
corporation had anti-basis in the assumed liability.
Thus, when the cases involving contingent liability tax shelters
arose, the Service had good legal support for denying the transferee
corporation a deduction on the transferred claim and weak or no
technical support for denying the transferor corporation the ability to
harvest the built-in-loss on its subsidiary stock. Faced with this
scenario, one might have expected the Service to pursue the
transferee corporation when it sought to deduct the transferred claim.
Instead, in every case, the government made losing technical
arguments against the transferor in an attempt to deny its ability to
deduct the built-in-loss on the subsidiary stock, but ultimately won by
convincing the courts that the economic substance doctrine applied.118
Congress ultimately amended the statute in 2000 to add § 358(h),
which requires the contributing shareholder to step down its stock
basis in transactions taking the form of our prototype.119 More
specifically, if a liability without anti-basis is shifted in a § 351 transfer
and the contributor winds up with a built-in-loss in its stock, stock
113. Indeed, the Service ruled on the issue of the transferee’s deductibility to voice its
disagreement with the Holdcroft court.
114. 153 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1946).
115. Id. at 325.
116. Id. at 324.
117. Id. at 325.
118. See WFC Holdings Corp. v. United States, 728 F.3d 736, 745–46 (8th Cir. 2013);
Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Black &
Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 436–37, 441–42 (4th Cir. 2006). Very
generally, the economic substance doctrine is a common law doctrine that courts apply to
deny tax benefits from arguably technically compliant transactions that were undertaken
solely or primarily to avoid taxes. See generally Joseph Bankman, Economic Substance
Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000) (providing an overview of the economic substance
doctrine).
119. Act of Mar. 9, 2009, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 412(c), 116 Stat. 21.
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basis must be reduced by the amount of the liability or the built-inloss, whichever is less.120 The rule is shut off when the facts are like
those assumed in revenue Ruling 95-74—that is, when the liability is
associated with the business or assets being contributed.121
Thinking through this rule with anti-basis reveals this statutory
fix to be a convoluted solution to the problem. Rather than fall back
on the basic rule for taxable exchanges and assign anti-basis to the
transferee corporation, which would be an elegant and complete
solution, in affected transactions the liability that began without antibasis for the contributing shareholder apparently remains without
anti-basis for the recipient corporation (on the strength of Revenue
Ruling 95-74, the domain of which should, as a conceptual matter, be
expanded by § 358(h)). The statute converts the anti-basis that would
arise for the transferee corporation in a taxable exchange into sharebasis reduction for the transferor. When applied, this rule prevents
the abuse at which it was aimed, but it is divorced from basic
principles and is more complicated than need be.
D. Noncapital, Nondeductible Costs
Most liabilities related to noncapital, nondeductible costs arise in
the personal context. To begin with an example that will be familiar
to most readers, suppose a taxpayer signs a note with a value
ultimately determined to be $500,000 in exchange for gambling chips
at a casino and then loses all the chips at the craps table.122 The
taxpayer walks out of the casino without tax basis in any asset
financed with the loan.123 Neither are any of her gambling losses
deductible.124 Yet she has anti-basis in the liability. Payment of the
$500,000 debt is a consumption expense, and consumption was the
benefit related to the liability in question.
Next, consider a taxpayer who is a debtor on a judgment debt of
$100 stemming from a (non-business) tort suit. Say the taxpayer was
at fault in a car wreck, and the $100 is the amount of the judgment or
settlement in favor of the victim. Does the taxpayer have anti-basis in
the judgment debt? Superficially, it appears that no benefit was
received, which would imply that there is no anti-basis. Functionally

120. I.R.C. § 358(h)(1).
121. § 358(h)(2); see Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, 38.
122. These are the basic facts of Zarin v. Comm’r, 916 F.2d 110, 111–12 (3d Cir. 1990).
123. The position that the taxpayer took tax basis in the gambling chips in the amount
of the loan is logically coherent, but it is ruled out (at least in the Third Circuit) by Zarin.
Id. at 114 (holding that gambling chips are not “property”).
124. § 165(d).
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this is the wrong answer. If the judgment debt is discharged without
payment, current law would assign COD income of $100, which, in a
system articulated in terms of anti-basis, only follows if the judgment
debt has anti-basis. So we must dig deeper.
Plainly the taxpayer did not get basis in any asset as a
consequence of the victim’s damages. Hence there is only a benefit in
this example if the $100 judgment debt represents consumption. This
turns out to be the correct way to think about cases of this type, but
the analysis is admittedly a bit tortured. Consider that if the taxpayer
had insured the risk that ripened into the judgment, the premium for
insurance would have been just another nondeductible cost tethered
to operating her personal-use vehicle, like gas. Going uninsured (or
underinsured) subjects the taxpayer in our example to some chance of
having to self-insure, and the judgment debt in our example is the cost
of such self-insurance (valued ex post, when the risk has already come
home to roost), which is a form of consumption.
Though unusual, at least some noncapital, nondeductible costs
arise in the business context. Imagine that Blackacre, property used in
a trade or business, is subject to a lien securing payment of a fine
relating to the owner’s use of the property in contravention of local
zoning laws. The fine is nondeductible,125 which implies it has antibasis. Where did the anti-basis come from? Anti-basis is the untaxed
benefit that a taxpayer enjoys as a concomitant of an increase in the
liabilities (or obligations) to which the taxpayer is subject. Here there
was no untaxed benefit (at least none that is obvious).
The best answer is that anti-basis in noncapital, nondeductible
costs comes from the public policy underpinning the particular rule
rendering the cost noncapital and nondeductible. As a functional
matter, fidelity to the policy choice that supports the rule of
nondeductibility means the liability must be assigned anti-basis. This
is an inelegant explanation, but it should be no surprise that defining
net income for tax purposes in service of nontax regulatory goals
requires unsightly patchwork.
As others have argued, in a system conforming to the accepted
economic definition of income, the fine would be deductible when
paid.126 This would put the output of the anti-basis test (no anti-basis)
and the conceptual underpinning of the test (no untaxed benefit
related to the liability) in harmony with one another. As noted in the

125. § 162(f).
126. See David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing: Business Deductions in a Net Income
Tax System, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1251–57 (2011).
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introduction, the contradiction between definition and test in cases of
this sort is evidence of tension between fundamental theoretical
concepts and present-law rules. It is not evidence of a wrinkle in the
anti-basis concept itself.
Finally, some noncapital, nondeductible costs arise at the
business-personal borderline. Take, for example, the rule that only
one-half of business-related expenses for meals and entertainment are
deductible.127 The Ways and Means Committee explained that “some
portion of business meal and entertainment expenses represent
personal consumption (even if the expenses serve a legitimate
business purpose) . . . . [D]enial of some part of the deduction is
appropriate as a proxy for income inclusion of the consumption
element of the meal or entertainment.”128 Suppose that the cost of a
meal is paid on credit and the resulting liability is discharged without
payment. Think of Artie Bucco cancelling the tab for Tony Soprano’s
many “business” meals at Artie’s Italian restaurant. One-half of
Tony’s tab was at least arguably deductible (zero anti-basis) and, to
this extent, cancellation should not generate income.129 The other half
of the liability (the nondeductible half, i.e., the half with anti-basis)
should generate income when cancelled.
IV. ADVANCED EXAMPLES
Thus far I have defined anti-basis and given a test for its
existence. I have also illustrated how the concept is woven into the
present law rules regarding transactions involving discharge of
liabilities, default on liabilities, and shifting of liabilities from one
taxpayer to another. Now I will turn to some more sophisticated
situations in which anti-basis arises, beginning with the original issue
discount (“OID”) rules.
A. OID Rules
The concept underlying anti-basis is fundamental to the OID
rules. The OID rules function by setting at issuance a debt’s “issue
price” and the schedule of calibrated, periodic increases to the issue
127. § 274(n).
128. H.R. REP. NO. 103–111, at 645 (1993). Boris Bittker put it better when he
explained that “[b]y joining in the merriment, the taxpayer who pays the bill usually
derives personal benefits from the activity.” TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 1, supra note 32,
¶ 21.2.1.
129. I am assuming that Tony has not claimed any deduction yet at the time the tab is
cancelled. If he has claimed his one-half deduction, then this generated anti-basis in the
liability equal to the amount deducted, and cancelation would generate income in the full
amount of the tab.
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price set to occur through maturity to reflect accretion of compound
interest.130 Each increase is treated for tax purposes as accrued
interest for both borrower and lender. The sum of a debt’s issue price
and the cumulative scheduled increases to a given date is referred to
as the debt’s “adjusted issue price.”131
At issuance, a debt’s issue price, and thereafter the debt’s
adjusted issue price, is identical to the borrower’s anti-basis in the
debt. This identity exists because adjusted issue price is the sum of (a)
issue price, equal to the borrower’s receipt of cash without income,
and (b) the borrower’s deductions for “phantom interest”
payments—that is, deductions for accrued but unpaid interest
accreting on the debt.132 The sum of these two items equals the benefit
to the borrower of incurring the debt. This is the definition of antibasis.
Borrowers will sometimes be able to cancel OID debts at a
discount if interest rates rise or if creditworthiness deteriorates while
the debt is outstanding. In the context of a bond or loan bearing
periodic interest at market rates (like the bank loan in the earlier
examples), I explained that the borrower would have COD income on
repayment if the borrower’s anti-basis exceeds the cost to the
borrower of extinguishing the debt.133 For OID bonds, this rule is
articulated in regulations under § 61 in virtually identical terms if one
substitutes “adjusted issue price” for “anti-basis.” The relevant
language is set out in the footnote.134
In the converse scenario—if rates fall or if creditworthiness
improves—the borrower might be required to pay a premium if it
wishes to cancel its debt before maturity. The regulations provide that
“if a debt instrument is repurchased by the issuer for a price in excess

130. § 1272(a).
131. § 1272(a)(3), (4).
132. Here I am imagining a debt that calls for neither any payments of stated
redemption price at maturity (“SRPM”) before the debt is extinguished in full nor any
payments of qualified stated interest (“QSI”). In other words, I am imagining a zerocoupon bond that is not an installment obligation. Anti-basis and adjusted issue price are
still identical if the debt is an installment obligation, or if it pays QSI in addition to OID,
or if both of these things are true, but the explanation becomes more tedious. See DAVID
C. GARLOCK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF DEBT INSTRUMENTS ¶¶ 505, 507 (6th ed.
2010).
133. See supra text accompanying note 44.
134. Treasury Regulation § 1.61-12(c)(2)(ii) provides as follows: “An issuer realizes
income from the discharge of indebtedness upon the repurchase of a debt instrument for
an amount less than its adjusted issue price . . . . The amount of discharge of indebtedness
income is equal to the excess of the adjusted issue price over the repurchase price.” Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1997).
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of its adjusted issue price . . . , the excess (repurchase premium) is
deductible as interest for the taxable year in which the repurchase
occurs.”135 For an OID loan, the exclusion of the loan proceeds from
income and the allowance of a deduction for accrued but unpaid
interest are both justified by the expectation that, in the end, the
borrower will repay the adjusted issue price (which equals the loan
proceeds plus the accrued but unpaid interest).136 If the borrower pays
more than this, a deduction is proper and is permitted by the quoted
regulation. Again this rule is implemented using anti-basis in concept,
though not in name.
B.

Premium and Discount Liability Shifts

The OID rules would form the basis of a conceptually coherent
approach to accounting for asset sales where the consideration paid
by the buyer includes accepting a liability shift. Congress originally
envisioned that the OID rules would be used for this purpose. In 1984
Congress overhauled the time value of money rules, creating the
modern OID regime.137 In the original legislation, Congress explicitly
authorized the Treasury to write regulations that would have applied
the OID rules to transactions involving debt shifts.138 This provision
proved controversial, however, and, bowing to pressure from the real
estate lobby, Congress amended the statute in 1985 to rule out the use
of OID concepts when accounting for debt shifts unless “the terms
and conditions of such debt instrument are modified (or the nature of
the transaction is changed) in connection with the assumption (or
acquisition).”139

135. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-7(c) (as amended in 2001).
136. Technically, the expectation is that the borrower will repay the “[s]tated
redemption price at maturity[,]” which always equals the adjusted issue price of the debt
at maturity. I.R.C. § 1273(a)(2); GARLOCK, supra note 132, ¶ 505.
137. For a first-hand account of the history of the OID legislation, see GARLOCK,
supra note 132, ¶ 514.
138. § 1275(d).
139. See § 1274(c)(4); GARLOCK, supra note 132, ¶ 310.01 (“Almost before the ink was
dry on the 1984 Act, [the provision authorizing regulatory extension of the OID rules to
assumptions] became controversial. The real estate lobby argued, in effect, that § 1274
should be limited to ‘abusive’ transactions and that selling property subject to a belowmarket debt was not an abuse, at least when the debt bore a market interest rate when the
initial loan was made.”).
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1. Present Law
The decision not to apply the OID rules to liability shifts (barring
a modification)140 means both the portion of the seller’s amount
realized and the buyer’s basis attributable to the liability shift are
determined based on the liability’s face amount, not its value.141 In
other words, premiums and discounts on liabilities are usually ignored
when liabilities are shifted in asset sales. This results in systematic
character and timing errors for both the buyer and seller; on the
bright side, ignoring premiums and discounts on liability shifts makes
tax administration simpler.
First consider a premium loan. Suppose that Blackacre (worth
$10 with a basis to the seller of $4) is encumbered by a liability with a
market value of $3 and a face amount of $2.70.142 If the lender agrees
to permit a shift of the liability from the seller to a buyer paying an
arm’s length price, the buyer would pay $7 cash, Blackacre’s net
value.
Under current law, the seller’s amount realized and the buyer’s
basis both would be $7 + $2.70 = $9.70.143 Thus the seller’s tax gain
would be $9.70 – $4 = $5.70. This is $0.30 (5%) less than the seller’s
economic gain. The shortfall equals the seller’s financing loss on the
loan shifted to the buyer.144 The $0.30 excess of the buyer’s economic
cost for Blackacre over her tax basis will be written off over the term
of the loan in the form of above-market interest deductions.
In this example, ignoring the loan premium probably hurts the
seller and helps the buyer. The seller is hurt because the financing loss
would be ordinary and the offsetting gain on Blackacre would likely
be capital.145 The buyer is helped because basis in Blackacre is

140. “Modification” is a term of art. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-3 (2011) (codifying the
holding in Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 560–68 (1991)).
141. See generally Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1001-1(g), 1.1012-1(g) (1996) (specifying the amount
realized attributable to the debt assumption and the cost basis attributable to the debt,
respectively). For a discussion of the exceptions to this rule, see id. § 1.1274-5; GARLOCK,
supra note 132, ¶ 310.02. See generally Alvin H. Shrago, The Uncertain Tax Treatment of
Liabilities in Corporate Acquisitions, 52 N.Y.U. ANN. INST. FED. TAX’N, §§ 19.01–19.07
(1994) (discussing the complexity of OID rules and confusion surrounding the nature of
the seller’s indebtedness and face-amount bias).
142. Interest rates have fallen since the loan was extended, creditworthiness has
improved, or some combination.
143. See I.R.C. § 274(n); see also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
144. Had the seller’s basis in Blackacre been $9 rather than $4, the $0.30 reduction in
gain would have been 30% less than her economic gain. If her basis were $9.70, the
percentage reduction in her gain would be 100%.
145. A corporate seller might be indifferent, given the lack of a corporate capital gains
preference.
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nondepreciable, but the incremental interest cost attributable to the
premium loan can be written off over the remaining term of the loan.
Next consider a discount loan. Blackacre (worth $10 with a basis
to the seller of $4) is encumbered by a liability with a market value of
$3 and a face amount of $3.30.146 Just as in the prior example, if the
lender agrees to permit a shift of the liability from the seller to a
buyer paying an arm’s length price, the buyer would pay $7 cash,
Blackacre’s net value.
Under current law, the seller’s amount realized and the buyer’s
basis both would be $7 + $3.30 = $10.30. Thus the seller’s tax gain
would be $10.30 – $4 = $6.30. This is $0.30 cents (5%) more than the
seller’s economic gain. The excess is attributable to the seller’s
financing gain on the loan. The $0.30 excess of the buyer’s tax basis
over her real cost should, in concept, be deductible interest, but it is
locked up in her nondepreciable basis in Blackacre.
Here, ignoring the loan discount probably helps the seller and
hurts the buyer. The seller is helped because her financing gain is
likely mischaracterized as capital gain.147 The buyer is hurt because
what is economically interest cost (usually deductible) is treated as
cost basis in nondepreciable property. In other examples, buyers
might be helped if the asset gives off depreciation deductions that are
allowed more quickly than interest deductions.
2. Hidden in Plain Sight
The present-law practice of ignoring premiums and discounts of
shifted liabilities is underappreciated. This is attributable, at least
partly, to a lack of adequate terminology. If the term anti-basis (or
some other term of equivalent meaning) were available, then the
analogy between liability gains and losses and asset gains and losses
would be more obvious. The obviousness of the analogy raises the
question why, in concept or in practice, there should be a different
standard for realizing liability gains and losses than for realizing asset
gains and losses.
When a lender (think bondholder) trades a loan in the market,
no one questions that the determination of her realized gain or loss
should be based on the difference between her basis in the liability
(corresponding to the price paid in the past) and the amount realized

146. Interest rates have risen, creditworthiness has declined, or some combination.
147. As before, this assumes that the underlying asset is capital and that the seller is
noncorporate. See supra note 145.
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on disposition. When a borrower trades her loan in the market as part
of an asset-liability package, why should the rules be different?148
In concept, the determination of the borrower’s realized gain or
loss should be the difference between her anti-basis (corresponding to
proceeds received in the past) and the amount she is required to pay
another to take her place as obligor on the debt. Although this is the
approach that produces symmetrical treatment for loans as assets and
as liabilities to the lender and borrower, respectively, ordinarily tax
lawyers do not conceptualize the borrower’s exchange in these terms.
The most likely explanation I think, is the lack of a key term in the
language of tax law: anti-basis.
3. Should the Rule Be Changed?
Before I move past the OID rules, I will digress briefly to explain
why I don’t think the current law treatment of discount and premium
loan shifts should be changed. I think anti-basis is useful because it
makes more obvious the policy implications of the present structure
and alternative approaches. In this context, though, the arguments in
favor of the present-law approach are stronger than those in favor of
reform. Administrative considerations trump conceptual tidiness.
Item
1. Blackacre gross value

Amount
10

2. Seller basis

4

3. Liability value

3

4. Liability face amount
5. Cash paid by buyer

2.70
7

148. Charlotte Crane asked a similar question in her article More on Accounting for the
Assumption of Contingent Liabilities on the Sale of a Business. See Crane, More on
Accounting, supra note 93, at 631. She posited a hypothetical where A is a roofing
contractor who promises to repair any problems that arise for some interval of time after
replacing a roof. Id. B is also a roofing contractor who sells similar services in a
neighboring state, with the same warranty. Id. Both A and B have booked all of the
income from the roofs sold, and neither is allowed any tax reserve for future repairs that
might be necessary. Id. Crane asks: If A and B swap territories, including warranty
obligations, has there been a realization event with respect to the exchanged liabilities? Id.
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If all of these facts are known and readily observable, then the
total consideration paid is worth $10, implying economic income of
$6, yet only $5.70 of gain is realized under present law.149 The $0.30
that is missing—the part not taxed—is the excess of value of the debt
over the seller’s anti-basis. Present law does not have a term for the
historical tax account for liabilities in the same way it does for assets,
so the exclusion of this increment of asset gain (and corresponding
exclusion liability loss) goes unnoticed. This theoretical objection,
explained above, illustrates the usefulness of anti-basis.
In real world transactions fewer facts are apparent. Items 1 and 3
(gross value and the liability value) are not observable directly and
cannot be deduced from the parties’ agreement. The parties’
agreement reveals only the net value of Blackacre. Although exact
figures for gross asset value and liability value cannot be deduced, the
difference between them must equal $7 (net asset value). If left
unchecked, the seller could operate under this constraint and still vary
the character of her income within a wide range.150 Giving taxpayers
flexibility in contexts like this is often a mistake. Tax burdens
ordinarily ought not to vary on account of facts that have no non-tax
economic significance for the parties to a given transaction.151
In some instances, when pressed to do so, policymakers have
developed solutions to problems of this type. The best example is the
very elaborate system of rules for allocating the price paid in a bulk
sale of assets under § 1060,152 the so called “residual method.” If a
farm is sold for cash, then the seller’s gain on cows, horses, tractors,
and land depends on the value assigned to each of them; and the
buyer’s basis (which has important implications for the timing of cost
recovery deductions) also depends on this same allocation. The price
paid sets the wide parameters for the allocation exercise, but the
allocation among asset classes and assets within each class depends on

149. The result described in the text is over-determined. Blackacre’s gross value, the
liability value, and the cash paid by the buyer are like the angles of a triangle—if you know
any two, you can figure out the value of the third.
150. She could say, for instance, that Blackacre was worth $7 and that the liability was
worthless, implying asset gain of $3 and liability gain of $2.70. Or she could say that
Blackacre and the liability were worth $15 and $8 and that her asset gain was $11, and her
liability loss $5.30. Either way her net income is $5.70, but the tax characterization
changes.
151. Andrews, supra note 12, at 955. Valuation related penalties would check
discretion to some extent, but even if the Service wins a few skirmishes, taxpayers will win
the war as they always do when tax burdens are made to depend on questions of value and
the facts are unclear.
152. I.R.C. § 1060.
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fair market value.153 Just as when an asset-liability package is
acquired, the value of the component assets, referred to collectively
as the farm, cannot be inferred from the terms of the bargain.
Taxpayers are required to proceed based on estimates. This system
has proven workable.
In the context of premium and discount liability shifts, however,
pursuing this approach is not worthwhile. Part of the conceptual
underpinning of the residual method of purchase price allocation is
the likelihood of divergent interests for the seller and buyer as to the
allocation and the requirement that they report for tax purposes,
consistent with any agreement they reach with regard to allocation.154
In the context of liability shifts, the parties’ interests are as likely to
align as they are to diverge.
One way to cabin taxpayer discretion in assigning value would be
to estimate the value of shifted liabilities by requiring taxpayers to
figure an imputed principal amount for the shifted debt as under
§ 1274,155 using the applicable federal rate or some other proxy for
market interest rates. The estimate of value would be added to the
cash consideration when fixing the seller’s amount realized and the
buyer’s basis. The buyer would then have anti-basis in the liability
equal to the estimated value of the debt, resulting in either OID
deductions156 (if the debt was valued at less than face value) or bond
issuance premium (if the debt was valued at more than face value).
This OID (or bond issuance premium) would be allocated over the
remaining term of the debt and would increase (or decrease) the
amount of deductible interest allowed to the buyer.
Though feasible, making this adjustment to present law would be
ill advised for at least three reasons. First, the determination of
commuted value of shifted liabilities using this approach would very
often assign a lower estimate of value than accepting that value equals
face amount, as under present law. When lender and borrower agree
to the terms of the loan at the outset, they have conflicting
commercial interests and a much better ability than the tax collector
153. For a thorough description of the residual method, see TAXATION OF INCOME
vol. 2, supra note 26, ¶ 41.6.8.
154. § 1060(a) (“If in connection with an applicable asset acquisition, the transferee
and transferor agree in writing as to the allocation of any consideration, or as to the fair
market value of any of the assets, such agreement shall be binding on both the transferee
and transferor unless the Secretary determines that such allocation (or fair market value)
is not appropriate.”).
155. § 1274.
156. These OID deductions would be in addition to any deduction permitted for
qualified stated interest owed on the debt.
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to adjust loan terms based on the particular facts. If those facts
haven’t changed much between loan inception and when the loan is
shifted, using a one-size-fits-all discount factor to reset the terms
seems unlikely to improve accuracy in valuation. On the other hand,
when the liability in question has remained outstanding during an
interval when market interest rates or creditworthiness (or both) have
changed meaningfully, reappraisal, even if by crude proxy, might be
an improvement. Yet I speculate that this is likely the exception, not
the rule.
Second, when debts are issued in connection with the acquisition
of property—purchase money debts—the parties have wide discretion
to set the interest rate by contract. So long as the contracted rate falls
between Applicable Federal Rates and “clearly excessive,” it is
respected for tax purposes.157 Forcing results to conform to a proxy
rate in liability shifts would create a schism between newly created
and shifted liabilities, which could be gamed with wraparound debt.158
Third, administration of the OID rules works by requiring the
lender to send a Form 1099-OID to the borrower. The system is set
up this way because in most cases the lender is well equipped to
perform the necessary computations of accrued OID and has an
incentive to do so in a fully transparent way that ensures
accountability: if the lender defaults on this chore, its OID deductions
are unavailable. In liability shifts, the lender is a bystander to the
transaction and has no claim to OID deductions that can be used as a
carrot to coopt the lender to act as de facto compliance officer for the
Service.
On the other hand, a seller who wishes to reckon her financing
gain (or loss) separately from her asset gain (or loss) has a de facto
election. She may settle the liability with the lender in a separate
transaction. The existence of this de facto election means that present
law spuriously penalizes sellers unable to disaggregate their asset and
liability realizations for commercial reasons unrelated to tax. This
seems unfair. It also encourages disaggregation for tax reasons even
when it would be desirable to shift the asset and liability together,
taxes aside. This is inefficient.

157. § 1274(b)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-3 (2012); Halperin, supra note 74, at 712–14.
158. See GARLOCK, supra note 132, ¶ 310.03. Wraparound debt “is seller financing
with respect to property on which there is existing debt.” Id. If the seller is debtor on the
existing debt and creditor on the wraparound debt owed by the buyer to the seller, the
seller’s net exposure can be reduced or eliminated without shifting the existing debt to the
buyer.
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To sum up, from a conceptual standpoint, present law is deficient
in that liability gains and losses that should be recognized by the tax
system when liabilities are shifted are (usually) mischaracterized as
asset gains or losses. This results in some ordinary income being
misclassified as capital gains income and creates timing differences.
When the mischaracterization helps taxpayers, they will accept the
benefit uncritically; when it hurts them, self-help is frequently
available by disaggregating the liability shift from the asset sale. The
conceptual deficiencies in present law might be difficult to correct
practically. Reliable liability valuation is difficult to estimate
(frequent errors should be anticipated) and the third-party reporting
system that undergirds periodic accounting for debts with OID or
bond premium would be difficult to deploy.
C.

Nonrecourse Debt in Excess of Value

Nonrecourse debt in excess of the value of the collateral is a
particular (and sometimes extreme) example of a discount liability.
This suggests that, in concept, the issues here are the same as those
described in the preceding part. However, the issues have been
resolved differently in this context, at least in some respects. The
issue, familiar to all tax lawyers, was confronted by the Supreme
Court in Tufts.159 True, Tufts (and Crane v. Commissioner,160 too)
dealt only with nonrecourse debt, but it is important to recognize that
when shifted liabilities are underwater it is commercially inevitable
that the liability in question is nonrecourse to the buyer, even if the
seller is personally liable.161
Suppose that a seller owned Blackacre free of debt with a tax
basis of $4. When Blackacre was worth $10 the seller pledged
Blackacre as collateral for a loan of $8. Over time Blackacre declined
in value to $7, and the seller then transferred ownership of Blackacre
to a buyer, subject to the loan of $8 (full principal still outstanding)
for nominal consideration of, say, $0.10. The buyer took Blackacre
subject to the debt but did not pledge her own credit.
The seller’s treatment is well settled, though more complicated
than need be. If the loan was nonrecourse to the seller (a point
intentionally not specified in the preceding paragraph), Tufts holds
159. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983).
160. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 3 (1947).
161. No rational buyer would commit her personal credit to an underwater assetliability package; it would be like burning money. The debt in Crane might have given the
lender recourse to Mrs. Crane’s deceased husband, but the Supreme Court never said one
way or the other.
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that the seller’s amount realized is $8, implying the seller’s gain is $8 –
$4 = $4. If the loan was recourse to the seller, on the other hand, then
the seller’s amount realized is $7 (Blackacre’s value), gain is $7 – $4 =
$3, and the seller has COD income of $8 – $7 = $1.162
Either way the seller’s overall income is $4, but in the first
version it is all classified as gain on sale of Blackacre, and in the
second it is divided between gain and COD income, which has
character implications that portend rate differences and possibly
excludable COD income.163 Thus the argument I made above in the
context of garden-variety discount loans applies here, too: In transfers
involving asset-liability packages, gain or loss on the asset and liability
aspects of the transaction should be reckoned separately; if they are
combined, income is mischaracterized, and some taxpayers harmed
by the mischaracterization will have a de facto option to change the
characterization by settling the debt in a separate transaction. If
combined accounting is defensible it must be on administrative
grounds.164
The buyer’s treatment under present law is unsettled. The
leading view among commentators and the few courts to have
considered the question is that the buyer’s tax basis in Blackacre
should be set equal to the fair market value of Blackacre on the date
of the transaction.165 There is a division of authority on exactly how
this rule should be implemented. Under one approach, the buyer’s
basis in Blackacre is $7.00, and under the other approach the buyer’s
basis is $7.10. The question is whether basis is simply set equal to the
fair market value of the property or, instead, whether basis should be
increased for the additional $0.10 of consideration paid by the buyer.
The buyer won’t have an incentive to pay significant consideration in
addition to accepting the liability shift, so the distinction here is
usually trivial.166
162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(2) (2011).
163. See I.R.C. § 108.
164. This is related to the argument, first made by Boris Bittker, that the taxation of
liability settlements cannot be made to depend on the use to which the proceeds have
been put. He argued that “[i]f the tax consequences of the borrowing are tied into the
transaction in which the borrowed funds are used, confusion is the very best that can be
expected.” TAXATION OF INCOME vol. 1, supra note 32, ¶ 7.1.
165. I am assuming here that the transaction is not a tax shelter in the pattern of Estate
of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). If the situation is akin to Estate
of Franklin, the buyer’s basis is likely to be zero.
166. GARLOCK, supra note 132, ¶ 311; supra text accompanying note 144. The more
defensible approach is to give the buyer a basis of $7.00. The $0.10 paid by the buyer is a
sunk cost. Hence an economically rational buyer will treat $7.00 of debt as genuine (up to
the value of the collateral) and should be given basis credit to this extent.
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Under present law it is uncertain when the buyer may adjust her
basis in Blackacre subsequent to the date of the sale. Two things
potentially reduce the extent of the undercollateralization: principal
payments on the debt and an increase in the market value of the
collateral. When undercollaterlization is reduced by either method, it
implies that some fraction of the principal balance not yet factored
into the buyer’s basis must now be respected by the buyer as a
genuine liability. Arguably, a basis increase is therefore justified in
these circumstances. This result depends on the conclusion that, from
the buyer’s perspective, the transaction remains open until the
liability encumbering the property is resolved, even though the
transaction was closed for the seller when the property was sold to the
buyer.
It is also possible to view the transaction as closed for both the
seller and the buyer. Under this view, the buyer’s basis is fixed when
ownership is acquired. If the buyer pays down principal after the
purchase, or if the value of the collateral increases and partially
resolves the collateral shortfall, no adjustment to basis would be
appropriate. If basis is fixed at the time of the sale, it is logical, though
not supported by any authority, that payments of principal in excess
of the principal that generated basis credit at closing would give rise
to a deduction. If this is not correct, a business-related expense will
simply be ignored, an alternative that is difficult or impossible to
justify.
Regardless of whether the transaction is treated as open or
closed for the buyer, if the lender agrees to reduce the outstanding
principal balance on the loan, the buyer should not have COD
income if the reduction in principal eliminates only principal in excess
of that for which the buyer has been given basis credit. If additional
principal is eliminated—i.e., principal that generated tax basis—then
COD income should result. This is the likely result under present law.
Now consider the problem with the help of anti-basis. Under the
leading view, the buyer would take a basis of $7 in Blackacre and
would take anti-basis of $7 in the liability shifted in the transaction. If
the transaction is left open (so the buyer’s basis can be adjusted
subsequent to the transfer), payments of interest would be deductible
and payments of principal would increase in the buyer’s hands both
basis in Blackacre and anti-basis in the liability. At the limit, if the
debt were paid in full, basis and anti-basis would increase to $8. On
the other hand if the transaction is closed, then payments of interest
would be deductible, payments of principal would offset anti-basis to
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the extent thereof, and those payments would then be deductible. As
usual, present law is easier to explain using anti-basis.
Anti-basis also sheds light onto the exact scope of the issue. The
Supreme Court and some commentators have explained that the
problem under consideration exists when the face amount of the debt
is greater than the fair market value of the property serving as
collateral.167 This is not the correct specification of the problem, at
least conceptually. The correct approach is to compare (a) the
discounted present value of all remaining principal and interest
payments on the debt (commuted value) with (b) the fair market
value of the property. Unless the commuted value of the debt exceeds
the market value of the property, the buyer will have an incentive to
honor the debt. This is true even if the face amount of the debt
exceeds the fair market value of the property.
If the debt’s commuted value (for emphasis, not the debt’s face
amount) is greater than the property’s value, then my suggestion
would be to give the buyer a basis in the property equal to the
property’s fair market value on the date of the transaction and to use
this figure also as the issue price of the debt. Some market index or
proxy rate of interest would then be selected or imposed. The debt’s
stated redemption price at maturity (“SRPM”) would be set so that
accrual of stated interest and OID (combined to equal the chosen
rate) would, over the remaining term of the debt, increase adjusted
issue price to SRPM at maturity. To the extent that the face amount
of the debt exceeds the SRPM, as so computed, the debt would be
treated as contingent. If the buyer ever had an incentive to pay any
amount over the SRPM (owing to a change in collateral value or paydown of principal), such payment would either be capitalized into
basis in the underlying asset or deducted, depending on whether one
prefers an open- or closed-transaction approach to accounting for
liability shifts.
D. Options as Contingent Liabilities
Suppose a short-seller (“S”) writes a call option purchased by a
long (“L”) over 100 shares of IBM stock for a premium of $10. Does
S’s commitment to sell IBM to L at the strike price have anti-basis?
The answer is plainly yes. The act of writing the option gave rise to
basis in the option premium (cash) received. The option premium is
167. See Crane v. Comm’r, 311 U.S. 1, 15 n.42 (1974); Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk and
Accrual: The Tax Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 44 TAX L. REV. 401, 409 (1989) (“The
holding in Crane does not apply if, upon the acquisition of property subject to nonrecourse
debt, the face amount of the debt exceeds the fair market value of the property.”).
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like the proceeds of a peculiar contingent loan, where S is the
borrower, L is the lender, and the obligation to repay depends on the
future price of IBM stock. Viewed this way, S must have anti-basis
given the similarity to the paradigmatic loan example.
This approach also maps onto the tax treatment of S under
present law. S has income if the option expires out of the money.168
This income is conceptually similar to COD income on a loan default,
except here default is replaced by good fortune (an unfulfilled
contingency that would have required payment). If the option settles
in the money or is exercised, payment by S is required. S’s loss (or
income) would be (a) the amount the option was in the money (the
excess of the price of IBM over the strike price of the option on the
date of exercise) less (b) the option premium. In other words, loss
(income) equals (a) payment minus (b) anti-basis.169
E.

Partnership Tax

Those versed in the intricacies of Subchapter K will have
recognized that the anti-basis test articulated above is congruent with
the definition of “liability” now embodied in the regulations under
Subchapter K, which reads as follows:
An obligation is a liability for purposes of section 752 and the
regulations thereunder . . . , only if, when, and to the extent that
incurring the obligation—
(A) Creates or increases the basis of the obligor’s assets
(including cash);
(B) Gives rise to an immediate deduction to the obligor; or
(C) Gives rise to an expense that is not deductible in
computing the obligor’s taxable income and is not properly
chargeable to capital.170
Think back through examples used in this article. Category (A)
deals with the bank loan.171 Category (B) deals with the inventory
168. See Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. 265, 267. This ruling comes close to mentioning
anti-basis when it explains that “[t]he premium received for writing the call is not included
in income at the time of receipt, but is carried in a deferred account . . . .” Id. “Deferred
account” is a synonym for anti-basis.
169. See id. at 268–69. The same analysis holds for put options mutatis mutandis. The
option writer is making a long bet on the underlying security, but the written put is a
contingent liability with anti-basis equal to the premium received. The option writer’s loss
equals the amount that must be paid to settle the option minus anti-basis (if the difference
is negative, it represents income).
170. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4) (as amended by T.D. 9207, 2005-26 I.R.B. 1344).
171. See supra text accompanying note 41.
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delivery example and similar cases: the shopkeeper’s obligation is not
a liability for purposes of § 752 unless and until a deduction accrues
and is classified as a liability only to that extent.172 Category (C) deals
with nondeductible fines and penalties, and other similar cases where,
in my usage, anti-basis is derived from public policy aspects of the
definition of income, rather than fidelity to underlying economic
concepts.173
The identity between this definition of “liability” and the output
of my test for anti-basis is explained by their common function. The
Subchapter K definition of “liability” is a rule grounded in the
aggregate theory of partnership taxation. In other words, the
definition (and its interaction with related operational rules) is
designed to ensure that the partners are treated in the same way vis-àvis the partnership’s business activities as if they had undertaken their
share of those activities on their own.
To illustrate why each category in the litany must be treated as a
partnership liability, consider the following three examples. In each
example X and Y are fifty-fifty partners in XY. Y always contributes
$5 cash and the facts vary for X from one example to the next.
Whenever X shifts a liability to the partnership, X remains personally
liable, so the liability is allocated solely to X under the § 752
regulations.174 Whenever the partnership incurs a liability in the first
instance, X alone is guarantor so, again, the liability is allocated all to
X, none to Y.175
First, X borrows $5 and purchases for $10 (using the borrowings
and $5 of savings) a $10 widget machine. X contributes the machine,
subject to the liability, to the XY partnership. X’s outside basis in XY
equals $10, derived from X’s $10 precontribution basis in the widget
machine.176 If instead X and Y formed the XY partnership, each
contributing $5 cash, and caused XY to borrow $5, for which X was
ultimately liable, and purchased the same widget machine, X’s outside
basis in XY would only be $5 if (contrary to present law) the
partnership’s commitment to repay the loan were not a “liability” in
the technical sense used in § 752.177 To ensure parity between cases of
these types is the reason why a liability that “creates or increases the

172. See supra text accompanying note 29.
173. See supra Section III.D.
174. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(a) (2011).
175. Id.
176. I.R.C. § 722.
177. Under current law the borrowing is a liability and it is allocated to X, so X is
treated as contributing $5 cash, increasing X’s outside basis from $5 to $10. See § 752(a).
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basis of the obligor’s assets” (category (A)) must be included within
the § 752 definition of liabilities.
To put it in general terms, partnership tax accounting endeavors
to maintain equality between the partners’ bases in their partnership
interests and the partnership’s basis in its assets (outside-inside basis
conformity). When the partnership makes a leveraged asset purchase
(or simply borrows and holds cash) it is the partnership’s basis in the
asset that the rules seek to replicate in outside basis, not the liability
itself. Thus the definition of liability must be restricted to those
obligations that correspond to assets with tax basis created or
increased by the obligation.
Next, to demonstrate the need for category (B) in the
definition—defining “liability” to include an obligation that “gives
rise to an immediate deduction to the obligor”—suppose that X is an
accrual method taxpayer who contributes to the partnership $10 cash
and an accrued but unpaid debt of $5. The debt is later paid by the
partnership. If the debt is not a “liability” then X’s outside basis in
her stake in XY is $10, and will remain $10 even after the debt is
discharged by the partnership.178 X’s interest in XY is worth only $5,
and so assigning a basis of $10 must be incorrect. If the debt is a
“liability” then X’s outside basis in XY is $10 so long as the debt
remains unpaid. Until the partnership pays the debt, X’s $10 outside
basis plus Y’s $5 outside basis equal the $15 basis XY has in its cash.
When the debt is paid, the decrease in X’s share of partnership
liabilities forces X to step down her basis to $5,179 denying X the
artificial tax loss she would otherwise enjoy. Thus category (B), like
category (A), is tailored to ensure outside-inside asset basis
conformity.
What results in this example if the debt in question had not been
paid or accrued (so that the debt lacked anti-basis)? It would not be
treated as a partnership liability. On formation, X’s outside basis in
her partnership interest would be $10. When the deduction
attributable to the debt accrued, the deduction would be allocated to
X, and the allocation of this deduction would trigger a reduction in
X’s outside basis from $10 to $5, so, again, X’s and Y’s outside bases
would sum to the partnership’s cash on hand. This illustrates that
debts that do not “[g]ive[] rise to an immediate deduction to the

178. Id.
179. §§ 752(b), 733(1).
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obligor”180 need not be included because the basis adjustment on the
deduction accrual will preserve outside-inside basis conformity.
Finally, consider category (C): debts that are nondeductible and
noncapital. X contributes $10 cash and an obligation to pay a $5 fine
to XY, everything else unchanged. If the fine is a liability then when it
is discharged by XY, X’s outside basis will drop to $5,181 so outside
basis and cash inside the partnership will both sum to $10; if the fine is
not a liability, then X will have an outside basis of $10 throughout
(even after the fine is paid), which means X could then sell her stake
in XY for its value ($5) and claim a loss corresponding to the
nondeductible fine. This would contradict the rule that fines are not
deductible.
Recall the definition of anti-basis: Anti-basis is the untaxed
benefit that a taxpayer enjoys as a concomitant of an increase in the
liabilities (or obligations) to which the taxpayer is subject. For
category (A) partnership liabilities, the untaxed benefit that makes
the obligation a partnership liability is tax basis in the asset, which
corresponds to liability. Partnership tax law attempts to ensure that
this debt-financed (inside) asset basis is reflected in the partners’
outside bases. Restricting the definition of “liability” to debts that
generate basis means that outside basis is created to this extent, but
no more.
For category (B) partnership liabilities, the untaxed benefit is a
tax deduction without payment. Outside basis must be given for the
cash or other property that backstops the partnership’s obligation to
make payment during the interval between when the liability is
deducted and when it is paid; then, on payment, the backstopping
asset and associated outside basis both disappear simultaneously.
Again, partnership tax law is not attempting to give outside basis
credit for the “liability” in its own right, but rather compensating for
the associated asset that exists in its reflection. The explanation for
category (C) partnership liabilities is similar, so I relegate it to the
margin.182

180. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4)(i)(B) (2011).
181. See I.R.C. § 705(a)(2).
182. A nondeductible fine or penalty (or other debt that is both nondeductible and
noncapital) is similar to a debt that is deducted before it is paid when both are viewed
from some time after the deduction is claimed but still prior to payment. For either type of
debt, payment will trigger no tax consequences. Thus if X transfers $10 cash and a fine of
$5 to XY, X’s outside basis should be $10 and then $5 before and after the fine is paid, just
as it was $10 and then $5 before and after payment of the debt for which the deduction
had accrued in the past.
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Thus Subchapter K tacitly incorporates anti-basis. Unlike
§§ 108(e)(2) and 357(c)(3), both of which articulate the test for antibasis (“would payment of this obligation give rise to a deduction?”) as
part of the formal rule, the § 752 regulations reticulate all of the
instances where the answer to the test question would be no, implying
the existence of anti-basis. The same result could be reached in any of
these cases using either approach to defining the scope of the rule.
CONCLUSION
Anti-basis is the untaxed benefit enjoyed by a taxpayer when a
liability or obligation is incurred. In the business context, the untaxed
benefit takes the form of an increase in asset basis or a tax deduction.
In the personal context, the untaxed benefit might take one of those
forms, or it might also be (nondeductible) personal consumption. A
well-functioning income tax system necessarily must keep track of the
presence or absence of any such untaxed benefit. If the liability is
avoided by the taxpayer, any prior untaxed benefit must be taken into
income (or be set off against basis); or, if there was no prior untaxed
benefit, exceptions are necessary to various rules requiring income
recognition (or basis reduction) on discharge or shifting of liabilities.
The Internal Revenue Code requires taxpayers to account for
anti-basis, but it does so ad hoc. Various sections tacitly incorporate
anti-basis—such as §§ 108(e)(2), 357(c)(3), and the partnership
definition of “liabilities” in regulation § 1.752-1(a)(4), to take just a
few of the many examples—but each section exists on an island. A
few prior commentators have sensed that some common underlying
principle ties these rules together conceptually. Prior to this Article,
however, there has been no thoroughgoing treatment of the concept.
In the end, recognizing and assigning a label to the concept that
ties together various rules for accounting for transactions in liabilities
is not likely to reshape doctrine or the language of tax law, other than
peripherally. It is useful and interesting, nevertheless, to understand
that within the baroque conceptual structure of income taxation built
up over the past hundred-plus years, there exists a dark star that
explains and justifies various liability-accounting rules, and reveals
their connection to each other and to the deep structure of our tax
system.
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